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Oral Histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed, and not
the official position of MORS. Omissions and
errors in fact are corrected when possible, but
every effort is made to present the interviewee’s
own words.
INTRODUCTION TO ORAL
HISTORY INTERVIEW OF DR.
RALPH E. BEATTY, JR.
In the summer of 1999, Ted Smyth, then
Chairman of the MORS Heritage Commit-
tee and now a past President of the Society,
and Gene Visco, FS, member of the Heri-
tage Committee, interviewed Dr. Ralph Be-
atty, long-time Navy operations analyst
and MORS participant. What follows is the
result of that extended interview. Two ses-
sions were held with Dr. Beatty, at his
home in Alexandria, VA: the first in May
and the second in July. The interviews were
under the auspices of the MORS oral his-
tory project to capture experiences from
operations analysts representing early con-
tributions to military operations research—
the heritage of our practice. The MORS
Oral History Project is documenting the
origins and early experiences of military
operations research in the United States.
Dr. Beatty began his career in opera-
tions research in 1942 as an early member
of the Anti Submarine Warfare Operations
Research Group (ASWORG) under the
leadership of Phil Morse. The ASWORG
was one of the earliest of the US institutions
to take on the title of operations research.
The present Center of Naval Analyses
traces its heritage to the ASWORG. Dr.
Beatty spent essentially all of his lengthy
operations analysis career with the Navy
groups that took on different names
through the years, starting with the
ASWORG, then with the Operations Re-
search Group (ORG), both during World
War II, migrating to designation as the
Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), and
eventually as the Center for Naval Anal-
yses (CNA).
In addition to his assignments with
overseas commands, in the Far East and
Europe, and his attachments to various
fleets of the Navy, Ralph had considerable
involvement with MORS. Among other
contributions, Ralph, with two colleagues
from the original ASWORG of the 1940s,
participated in the first ever Heritage Pro-
gram during the annual MORS Symposium
of 1992, commemorating the 50th anniver-
sary of the beginning of military operations
research in the U.S.
Ralph Beatty’s experiences, his applica-
tions of various scientific fields blended
with operational analyses, as spelled out in
the following oral history, are exciting, ed-
ucational, and inspiring. The history will be
read—devoured, perhaps—by both the
young, new analyst and the old, experi-
enced hand, for all will benefit from the
words—truly words of wisdom. Among
Ralph’s closing comments are these:
“One of the things I would stress is look-
ing to the past and not forgetting the past.
Pay attention to what’s happened before.
There might be some useful ideas there.
Also, pay attention to the impact of tech-
nology on what you’re doing. Make sure
you master the tools for making good
models. It’s not necessarily the latest arti-
ficial intelligence program, but maybe it’s
a combination of some simpler things.”
[Note: Messrs. Brian Engler and Robert
Sheldon, FS, contributed valuable com-
ments during the review of the following





INTERVIEW OF RALPH EMERSON
BEATTY, JR., PhD. WITH GENE VISCO
AND TED SMYTH
MR. VISCO: This is an interview with
Dr. Ralph E. Beatty, Jr. The interview is
being conducted at the home of Dr. Beatty
in Alexandria, Virginia. Ralph, if you could
start off with your early background,
where’d you come from, and early educa-
tion, and that sort of thing.
DR. BEATTY: My full name is Ralph
Emerson Beatty, Junior—I always like to
get the Emerson in there, and I am a PhD.
That was the basic data on your form here.
It says “Title.” I don’t know what you’d call
me. Senior scientist is, I guess, the closest
approximation to a title.
You’ve got my phone number and my
E-mail address. My current professional af-
filiation is retired, self-employed consul-
tant, although I’m not really doing much
consulting right now. I do have an informal
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contact with Admiral/Senator Denton—Jer-
emiah Denton—who’s been a friend and close
associate during much of my career in OR. He’s
the former senior Vietnam POW hero who be-
came a senator from Alabama. He’s now very
much involved in the Kosovo relief operation.
I’m having discussions with him, and keeping
him in touch with what I learn that might be of
interest.
He invited me to a meeting last year of the
NDTA, the National Defense Transportation
Association, in connection with shipping hu-
manitarian relief after Hurricane Mitch and
other crises.
I’m not really what you’d call “real active”
in that. It’s kind of a minor thing; I’m not paid.
We’re sending E-mail back and forth.
MR. VISCO:Where were you born, Ralph?
DR. BEATTY: I was born in Pittsburgh in
1920, went to Langley High School and then
Carnegie Tech from 1938 to 1942. I’ve got these
charts over here that my grandson prepared as
a school project. [A copy of the charts could not
be included due to printing challenges.]
Pull those out and then I’ll refer to them a
little bit. The first one covers the early periods
of my life. He was giving this talk at school and
pretending he was me.
I helped him a little bit with this, providing
pictures and articles to illustrate my career,
through high school, college, World War II—
the ASWORG (Anti-Submarine Warfare Oper-
ations-Research Group) days—and then OEG
(Operations Evaluation Group) through the
’50s with emphasis on the 6th Fleet “Haystack”
experiences. The last chart covers everything
else since at OEG, CNA (Center for Naval Anal-
yses), SAIC (Science Applications International
Corp), TASC (The Analytical Sciences Corp.),
and MORS—this lists the principal studies that
I was involved in. I could go over some of that
later, although I gather the emphasis is more on
the early days rather than later.
MR. VISCO: More, but you can certainly
touch on that because of the contribution it
would make. And maybe we’ll try to take a
photograph of these later.
DR. BEATTY: Eventually, I’ll probably put
those on videotape and put it in a more useful,
retrievable form. This first chart does document
the high school and Carnegie Tech period. This
is really, really old. I was into model airplanes,
and I was a member of what they called the
Junior Birdmen in those days. Langley High
School was named after the famous Samuel
Pierpont Langley who also built model planes.
I was the commander of the Birdmen in our
school group. We had a team that won the
Allegheny County outdoor and indoor cham-
pionships. This newspaper picture shows the
little glider that flew over 30 minutes. My cabin
model flew out of sight in about 12 minutes. We
won the cup with two first places in three
events.
I also gave flight demonstrations in the
high school auditorium. Even today some chil-
dren remember my flying the airplane out, over
the audience, and back to the stage.
MR. VISCO: Terrific.
DR. BEATTY: I was, of course, interested
in math. I had a very good algebra teacher who
encouraged me. Although I was interested in
science, math, and physics, my chemistry
teacher had more influence on me than my
physics teacher did.
Some of my teachers were friends of my
mother, who was very helpful in getting me
into college. Taking the Allegheny County test
was critical. For some reason or other my name
wasn’t on the list to take the test. My mother
found out about it and got some teachers ex-
cited enough to go to the vice principal to get
my name on the list. It turned out that I out-
performed practically all the other people from
our school, placing near the top in Allegheny
County. As a consequence, I got a scholarship
to Carnegie Tech, which was the beginning of
my career.
MR. SMYTH:What was your major at Car-
negie Tech?
DR. BEATTY: At Carnegie I went into
mathematics, although I was taking both math
and physics. I took a lot of physics courses, but
I got my degree in math. I was influenced by
several good teachers, including the head of the
department—Professor Dines a very kindly old
man with a white goatee. One of the teachers—
Professor Rosenbach—was very energetic in
getting a Math Club started at Carnegie. I
ended up being the president of the Math Club.
That was an activity that got me deeper
into math by holding seminars on very special
projects. We had a team that participated in one
of the early Putnam examinations. Putnam was
a famous math exam, given countrywide. Over
50 years ago it was just getting started.
At any rate, our team placed very high. I’m
not sure exactly where I was on that, but Nor-
man Painter and I were both selected to go to
MIT on applied math fellowships. I think it had
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a lot to do with our placement on that Putnam
exam, and probably was related to our having
both math and physics in our backgrounds.
Norman Painter and I started in the sum-
mer of ’42 at MIT. Carnegie was the only school
that had two people in the applied math group.
MR. VISCO: Is that P-a-i-s-t-e-r?
DR. BEATTY: Painter. P-a-i-n-t-e-r. He had
connections with some of the other OR people.
He was a close friend of Frank Bothwell’s at
MIT. He ended up working at the Lincoln Lab
with Bothwell. That’s how I first got to know
Frank Bothwell.
That’s also how I got to know Phil Morse. It
was a long summer session where we were just
taking courses. This was the first group of
about ten at MIT in applied math.
Melvin Lax was one of them; he’s at Cornell
now. Steven Crandall who became the head of
the Mechanical Engineering Department at
MIT was another member. I’ve lost track of the
others, but I do know Crandall and Lax are
well-known.
It was probably October when the session
was ending up. People were starting to get into
war work at this point. I was already long
overdue to start getting involved. The war was
going on. Morse called me in and proposed my
joining this new operation that was going on—I
think he was calling it Operations Research
even then. But, during those days it had the
name, ASW Operations Research Group. So the
words Operations Research were being used
very early.
That’s how I got started. It sounded inter-
esting to me. I always liked the potential of
traveling. Since I liked the applied type of
mathematics anyway, that was very appealing.
We started off working in Washington on all
kinds of projects. However, until I got my clear-
ance I worked in Morse’s office doing some of
the early search and screening calculations. The
book on Search and Screening was largely Ber-
nard Koopman’s and George Kimball’s work.
They put it all together, but they brought to-
gether things that had been worked on by ev-
erybody else during the war. Koopman put the
nicest mathematical flavor on it.
Some of the curves you see in Search and
Screening come from the kinematics and geo-
metric type of calculations I was working on at
MIT. They were sophisticated encounter rate
problems. For example, at what angle do you
sight an object that’s going along a certain
course? What’s the probability you’re going to
see an object in a certain direction. I won’t go
into the details of that.
But that was something you could do with-
out a clearance. You could do it up there.
MR. SMYTH: Now when you say “up
there,” is most of that work that you’re refer-
ring to up in Cambridge at MIT?
DR. BEATTY:Well, the work at MIT was a
very small part of work that was mostly being
started down in Washington.
There was an office in Boston also at that
time. But the first few months (the end of ’42
and early ’43) I was down in Washington doing
more routine types of data collection and anal-
ysis. The first project I remember was analyzing
data from the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations)
plot.
This was something that everybody got
their fingers into. It was a picture taken of a big
map showing the convoys and where the sub-
marines were supposed to be. I didn’t know it
at the time but the sub positions were actually
pretty accurate. We didn’t realize till later that
those submarine positions were something that
had been determined by breaking the German
code. I think that story may be in the OEG
history book by Tidman. Jay Steinhardt was the
one that found out about it by analyzing the
accuracy of so-called DF fixes of submarine
high frequency radio transmissions. There were
quite a few submarines scattered all across the
Atlantic. Analyzing the position accuracy and
comparing with what you would estimate
based on just knowing the basic accuracy of
over-the-horizon intercept equipment. Stein-
hardt found that these positions were far too
accurate.
There was something going on here that
led Steinhardt and then Morse to take it to the
Navy who admitted something else was going
on there.
But, I did work with data collection. That
was one of the main research activities there.
They divided the off-shore area into zones and
cells, where you counted activity. There was an
analysis of how the activity varied off-shore,
particularly how your air ASW capability
pushed the subs off-shore.
You see where the activity is, and it’s all
ground up into various tables—numbers of
units, contacts, and so forth—from which you
get search rates. A search rate was a key mea-
sure of effectiveness. It was a moderately stable
number despite all the variations.
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You find out what the interaction rates are.
This was one of the numbers which—as Morse
said, they use decibel, or hemibel, thinking in
looking at things. You get a “rough cut” at
something. Don’t worry about the last decimal
point, but make sure you’re in the right ball
park in what you’re doing.
This data collection provided the inputs to
various analyses using search theory. Much of
the basic work on search theory had been de-
veloped before I had gotten there. The elements
of search theory were already in hand.
MR. VISCO: Where was the group physi-
cally located? The group was together by this
time in Washington.
DR. BEATTY: We were down in the Navy
Department—on Constitution Avenue. There
were two World War I temporary buildings.
Fairly large—located about where 18th Street
and 19th Street come in. There’s a reflecting
pool in back. In back of the building there were
a lot of other temporary buildings as well.
There were some ordnance buildings—Bureau
of Ordnance (BUORD) was back in there.
MR. VISCO: That’s in the same area where
what used to be called the Old Munitions
Building was located, right?
DR. BEATTY: Right. The Munitions Build-
ing was the War—
MR. VISCO: War Department Building.
DR. BEATTY: Like the War Department.
The two buildings were similar. Looking from
the front, the Navy building was on the left and
the Munitions was on the right. We were up on
about the third or fourth deck. All wooden
decks up there. There were big old offices. You
worked in an area with a lot of desks, so there
was a lot of communication back and forth
between people. You could see what people
were doing.
MR. VISCO: Ralph, at that time, did you
know Germond—H.H. Germond?
DR. BEATTY: No.
MR. VISCO: He was still working there,
even in the early ’50s, in those same buildings.
He was a mathematician.
DR. BEATTY: Yes I think he was with
NDRC (National Defense Research Commit-
tee), or something like that. He was famous for
some of the ballistic tables—all kinds of math-
ematical tables.
I didn’t meet Germond, but I did have con-
tact with Burrington and Torrance I don’t know
if you remember them or not. They were the
chief scientists in BUORD, I believe.
I remember, because at Carnegie Tech our
calculus book was Burrington, and I never liked
that book! It was too abstruse; it wasn’t applied
enough. In fact I had the same feeling when I
got more involved with similar kinds of work
he was involved in on weapons effectiveness
analyses for BUORD. I got involved in duels,
back and forth with them, on which weapons
you wanted to select. But that came out of my
wartime work, and early post-wartime work.
As you say—what were some of your early
projects? Well, search theory and ASW data.
ASW attack errors was a very key thing I got
involved in. In fact one of the first projects I had
was one of the first studies of ship attacks on
submarines—looking at the different fire con-
trol systems to do this.
Part of the worry was the submarine’s go-
ing deeper, so, you had to get in close to the
submarine to attack it. Particularly with depth
charges, you had to go over it, and you would
lose contact. Then the sub would be evading,
and your chances of hitting it poor. Particu-
larly, if your charges were sinking slowly and
the submarine was deep and fast, then you
would likely miss it.
We were doing some early tests using an
attack trainer up in Boston. That was one of the
projects for my first field assignment up there.
We were studying the accuracy of different fire
control systems, including “seat of the pants”
type techniques where all you knew were the
bearings and how the bearings were changing
(the bearing rates), and you tried to guide your
ship using a lead angle depending upon the
bearing rates, trying to get on to a constant
bearing course to head for the target to inter-
cept it.
It was kind of crude, but they had a fairly
sophisticated attack trainer, a pretty good sim-
ulator, where they trained people to go out to
make their attacks. We collected a lot of data
from those operations to find out how the at-
tack errors depended on various factors. In
Washington we actually set up our own first
little, very simple, computer simulator. George
Kimball was behind this. We had what
amounted to a little box with a circular screen
on it, like a PPI scope. You could move the
target on there—the submarine target—and
you could move your ship, and actually control
it like a simple computer model to make attacks
on the submarine, losing contact at a certain
point. We played with that and made a lot of
runs to use it as an analysis tool for investigat-
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . RALPH BEATTY, JR.
Page 48 Military Operations Research, V9 N3 2004
ing how attack errors would vary with different
fire control systems, et cetera.
MR. VISCO: That’d be considered an ana-
logue computer—
DR. BEATTY: It was very much an ana-
logue computer. George Kimball got started on
it, and then I was one of the key individuals
running it and collecting data, getting different
people to be the ship captains, trying to get a
better idea of what it was all about.
MR. SMYTH: Did you use mostly Navy
people to do that, or were they—
DR. BEATTY: Not all. Mostly Navy people
were involved in Boston where we were ana-
lyzing the trainer data. But, in Washington,
where we were doing some of our own re-
search, it was mostly our own staff people. This
led to getting involved with ahead-throwing
systems—such as rockets and mortars.
There was concern about submarines going
deeper, getting down to 1,000 feet or so—over
500 feet was pretty deep for a submarine in
those days. There was also worry, towards the
end of the war, that the submarines were going
to come out and be faster. That was one of the
coming problems we were trying to research.
I got involved in looking at things like pat-
terns—large patterns of depth charges to use
against the deeper submarines—and with two-
ship attacks. They had one ship guide the other
ship across so it didn’t lose contact.
We got involved also with trying to analyze
the British ahead-throwing system, which was
called Squid, which was sent over in ’44. The
H.M.S. Hadleigh Castle came over, operating
out of New London, I think it was. They were
demonstrating this ship to the United States. It
was sent over for us to observe and collect data
on its capability.
Because it was the latest anti-submarine
ship, it had special sonar—a 2D sonar (search
light sonar), and a depth-determining sonar,
which was something that we didn’t have—a
tilting 3D sonar you could use to measure the
depth angle.
But, more importantly, it had new, longer-
range, mortars on the bow of the ship that
could shoot a pattern of three to six Squid pro-
jectiles. These mortars were pretty large—it
was like firing depth charges. Previously, the
ahead-thrown charges were either small mor-
tars (Hedgehogs) or small rockets (Mouse-
traps).
You could fire a pattern of 24 of these small
charges to about 200 yards range. This new
weapon went out to 300 yards and was influ-
ence-fused, and also could be set to explode, so
these were ahead-thrown depth charges. It was
a much more potent attack system, on the idea
that it could handle deeper and faster targets.
The ship was sent down to Fort Lauderdale
for testing. There was a Test and Evaluation
Command, sort of the OPTEVFOR (Operational
Test Evaluation Force) of its day. The early
OPTEVFOR started in Quonset. That’s one of
the first places we were sent to analyze some of
the data from sea tests, mainly the paper tape
recordings that were part of the fire control
system. They had range recorders and bearing
recorders for both types of sonars.
Ted was asking me about the name of the
British ship that came over to demonstrate the
Squid weapons system. I’m not quite sure
where the name Squid comes from, but the
Hadleigh Castle was their most modern anti-
submarine warfare frigate.
Jim Tyson was involved in some of the
early work on that ship. I came up to Quonset
Point to observe the collection of some of this
data. I also went out on one of the at-sea tests.
This was my first exposure to Navy life. I went
out in a small ship, like a PC, and then trans-
ferred to a whale boat, across to the Hadleigh
Castle stationed about 150 miles off the coast in
rough weather—about sea state 6.
Extremely rough. It was really scary. I came
alongside the British ship, where we were go-
ing up and down about 10 or 12 feet, sitting
beside the ship. You had to jump on to a ladder
and scramble up, with people grabbing you
and pulling you up.
MR. VISCO: You were about 23?
DR. BEATTY: I was just 23 years old. I
barely managed to watch this exercise, but I
mostly remember the ship’s captain. He was
one of those typical Scotsmen with a reddish
beard. He quickly could tell that I wasn’t quite
“with it,” and wanted to give me some strong
drink to help me out.
I ended up getting totally seasick. It was
something I still remember, how I felt, until I
got back to shore and things started to settle
down a little bit. I didn’t want to do that again!
That was a really rough experience. But I did
see what was happening, and watched the ship
perform.
Later, the ship was moved down to Fort
Lauderdale for more extensive tests. They al-
ready had an air station down there and a
surface development unit. It was called Surface
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Anti-Submarine Development Detachment
(SURASDEVDET). The surface detachment was
stationed at the Coast Guard base in Port Ever-
glades. That’s totally transformed today. You
wouldn’t realize what this looks like today. I’ve
been back and tried to find where our old
building was, and it’s pretty hard to find. I
lived there in the BOQ, initially, while we were
doing ASW testing. We worked over on the
pier side with a bunch of Navy people. It was
just Tyson and me, initially. We were doing a
very systematic analysis of exercises, where the
ship would go out and make attacks on a real
submarine that was towing a surface buoy. So,
the sub was pretty shallow.
It towed that buoy, so the submarine was
marked. We knew where it was. While the ship
was making attacks on the sub the CIC (Com-
bat Information Center) personnel didn’t know
where that buoy was. Then they would shoot a
practice charge from the Squid mortar, about
300 yards out, where it would make a splash.
So it would mark your attack in relation to the
buoy (submarine). Navy photographers on
board ship took pictures of this, then we got
involved in the photogrametry of the pictures
to analyze the horizontal directions and dis-
tances of the splash and buoy.
From that data we could get a pretty good
idea of what the true attack errors were—there
was some ballistic error in there we had to
account for too.
We had sailors, pretty well trained sailors,
working for us. We had also some lieutenants
that were well-educated. One was a musician
and the other was—I forget. But they were both
sonar people—trained in music. These were
pretty sharp young people.
We also had several enlisted people. They
were making the detailed measurements on all
these pictures, and then converting them. We
had data forms to convert all this, to make
calculations.
In addition, we had a lot of other data from
the fire control system on these paper tapes that
measured ranges and bearings. What inputs
were going into the fire control system to allow
this analog computer to make the calculations.
From all that, we would do an analysis of
component errors—the sonar location error, the
fire control error, and the evasion error due to
the submarine’s movement, and so on.
So we really got into the “guts” of that. We
wrote a pretty detailed scientific report on the
performance of the Squid using physical and
statistical analyses of all the attack errors to
obtain the two-dimensional Gaussian error dis-
tributions, including bias errors.
While we were still doing that analysis, I
came up to Washington, got married to Doris
and brought her down to Florida. It was one of
the first field assignments where we had the
wife actually out on the assignment in the field.
Ft. Lauderdale was a very nice place to be
during the war. It was beautiful there, and
there were other analysts down there too.
Jim Tyson was there, initially, but he
turned it over to me in December. He went on
to other things while I took over. I was the key
OEG analyst there at the base.
MR. VISCO: This is September of ’43?
DR. BEATTY: December of ’44 now. There
were a lot of other things going on there. It was
not just tactics analysis. There was also work
going on there with the MIT acoustics labora-
tory. They were doing tests of noisemakers.
They had in fact invented the classic noise-
maker, the parallel bars. It’s like two pipes held
together, closely held together, clamped at the
ends. When you tow this device through the
water the flow of the water through it makes
these bars vibrate back and forth, making a
huge racket.
The idea was to generate enough sound
behind a ship that you could decoy an acoustic
torpedo away from it. That was the concept.
The noisemaker was being developed by an
MIT professor—Fay—who worked for Morse,
on the technical side of their acoustics. The MIT
group included Peter Westervel who I got to
know better after the war at the MIT acoustics
laboratory where we both worked with Morse,
getting PhD’s in acoustics.
This was just an interesting little connec-
tion. There was also another group of ex-OEG
scientists there in Ft. Lauderdale, including Jim
Dobbie and Martin Klein. Both should be on
your list for future interviews. I don’t know
where Dobbie is now, but Klein is a famous
science historian (particularly on Einstein) who
was at MIT and is now associated with Yale.
MR. SMYTH: I had a question about—
kind of an administrative thing. How were you
paid? Were you an employee of MIT, or were
you being paid directly by the Navy? Or how
was this group actually administered?
DR. BEATTY: We were paid by Columbia
University, not MIT. The contract was under a
Division of the NDRC (National Defense Re-
search Committee) to provide scientist support
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to the Antisubmarine Warfare Unit under Cap-
tain Baker in Boston in early 1942. Professor
Phil Morse of MIT was head of the group (Re-
search Group M—or ASWORG) and recruited
MIT and other University scientists, including
Bill Shockley from Bell Labs as Director of Re-
search. When Baker was transferred to Wash-
ington most of ASWORG also moved there. At
the end of the war the contract was switched to
MIT. I’m not sure of the exact switchover. It’s
probably in that OEG history book. That situa-
tion held true up until ’62 when they switched
again and OEG became CNA. Then there was
the interim period under Franklin Institute.
That period of turmoil, followed by Rochester,
then Hudson Institute, and then, finally, today
CNA is a private corporation. But we were
under Columbia and MIT for quite a long time.
MR. SMYTH: So during the war, when you
first started to work there, you were technically
a Columbia University employee?
DR. BEATTY: Yes, although there was an
MIT connection, since Morse was running the
group. I think the Columbia connection was
something we didn’t really appreciate. Colum-
bia did have another group doing sonar re-
search studies. As a matter of fact—before I got
involved in the Squid analysis—I was involved
with this group doing an analysis of sonar in
New York City—in the Empire State Building.
So I spent three weeks or so during—I
think this was early ’44—I’m hazy on the exact
dates and it doesn’t show up on the field as-
signments [in the OEG history book]. But it was
an interesting little change for a while. I was
working with Conyers Herring, who’s not
strictly an OR type, but he had his fingers in
this.
MR. SMYTH: What’s his name again?
DR. BEATTY: Conyers Herring H-e-r-r-i-
n-g. He’s still alive. He’s a fairly well-known
solid state physicist.
MR. SMYTH: Yes I’ve seen the name.
DR. BEATTY: Besides Conyers Herring,
there’s also Shockley, and Charles Kittel who
was a wartime member. Shockley’s passed
away. But Kittel is still alive and Conyers Her-
ring is still alive. And those are two pretty
famous solid state physicists. Kittel was in our
group, while Herring consulted with our group
and worked on physics of sound [explosive
sound] in the sea. There was a lot of sonar work
at other labs, such as Harvard, Scripps, San
Diego, WHOI (Woods Hole Oceanographic In-
stitute), and MIT. Primakof and Pekeris, for
example, were doing studies of partial differ-
ential equations of acoustic transmission. Some
pretty advanced studies of wakes and more
sonar physics. So, there was interest in the uti-
lization of sonar, and comparisons of the old
searchlight sonar with the new scanning sonar
that sends out a ping in all directions. It’s like
they’re working on radar. The receiving beam’s
going around real fast, like the Aegis radar
(electronics scan). Scanning a sector with the
old narrow beam sonar was a slow physical
process. You had to send out a ping and wait
for the echo to get back, and then train the beam
and ping again. There were questions about the
optimum scanning procedure. Which way do
you rotate? How big a sector?
I got involved with a more detailed analy-
sis of that, where we modeled the searchlight
sonar with a probability pattern, using a grid
of cells—an analog version of current finite-
dimensional computer techniques.
The sonar beam pattern is like a radio an-
tenna beam. Near the center the sensitivity is
stronger and it tapers off, so you have less than
100 percent coverage. Thus the detection prob-
ability is higher along the axis and tapers off in
range and bearing. We represented this by the
density of coverage of the small grid cells. We
used a big diagram with a lot of little dots
indicating cells with 100 percent detection. It
was a laborious process. Move this pattern
around, and mark your dots to get the overall
coverage of the scanning process. It was the
sort of “dirty work” it would have been so nice
to have had a computer to do.
The project was a little thing that appears
somewhere in one of the technical books. You
can get a picture of the diagram that I drew up
with the help of Conyers Herring. I was as-
signed to work with Conyers and the Columbia
group in New York for almost a month. I en-
joyed meeting other scientists there who were
doing work in statistics. One of them—it may
have been Molina—was into the Bell Labs
queuing theory. Some of them belonged to this
club downtown, near Wall Street or close by. I
know it was a fancy place to go for lunch. They
took me down there several times.
In Washington, I was mostly doing analysis
of attack data and ship and aircraft tactics vs.
submarines. Weapons effectiveness calcula-
tions were a major activity. I applied the same
techniques to calculate optimum patterns for
aircraft attacks on ships.
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That was a special project I did for Shock-
ley. He was shifting to become Director of Re-
search for the Air Force, I think, and was inter-
ested in looking at the problem of attacking
ships in the Pacific with sticks of bombs from
planes. He wanted to know what would be the
optimum spacing of these bombs, and what
angle to attack the ship to maximize the hitting.
He knew that I had been doing some similar
kind of work with calculations on depth
charges hitting submarines, so he had me make
some quick calculations for him to come up
with optimal intervalometer settings. You’d
think they’d have somebody else doing this,
but he wanted something quick to help the
squadrons in the field. They needed an answer,
and within a day or so, they had an analysis.
There was another time I used Gaussian
probability paper for quick calculations. You’ve
probably seen it. It’s just a scatter diagram of a
thousand points distributed normally. All you
have to do is place the error distribution over
the target vulnerable area and count hits. It’s a
“poor man’s Monte Carlo” calculation. You can
make calculations very rapidly that way. To
account for elliptical errors, you just distort
your target area. I used that approach for prac-
tically all my weapons calculations. It’s a
“quick and dirty” approach we developed by
generating our own probability plots of nor-
mally distributed cells. Circular probability pa-
per was also published by RAND, but I’m not
sure when their charts were available to the
Navy.
I used circular probability plots for calcu-
lating hit probability of different kinds of
weapon patterns against submarines. That sec-
ond poster board illustrates what I’ve been talk-
ing about here. That’s a sample that’s in the
Operations Research book—the Squid problem.
In fact, that came frommy calculation. But as an
example here it is (the Squid problem) in OEG
Report 54, “Methods of OR.” This is the classic.
In fact, this is the original old soft-cover ver-
sion. Here’s the pattern of three Squid charges
in the shape of a submarine. The whole pattern
is distributed with a Gaussian distribution. This
appears on the board and also in the book. Yes,
that’s my drawing, right there. Other pictures
of mine appear in the Search and Screening book
(OEG Report 56). The Squid problem was also
featured in Morse and Kimball’s article “How
to Hunt a Submarine” (vol. 4 of Newman’s
“World of Mathematics”), which came from the
Methods of OR book.
MR. SMYTH: That’s the report that later
became Morse and Kimball?
DR. BEATTY: Morse and Kimball; yes.
MR. SMYTH: Right. I don’t know whether
you’re aware of it or not but MORS has just
reprinted that.
DR. BEATTY: Yes. That’s what I under-
stand; yes. You had a better copy.
MR. VISCO: Yes. I think it would be useful
if MORS would perhaps donate a copy of that
to Ralph.
DR. BEATTY: Yes, because I’ve lost my
later version. This copy is an older one, but I
had a later (red-cover) copy that was borrowed
from me. I’m missing some other classics, too.
Report 51 on ASW in World War II was bor-
rowed from me and never returned. There’re
several others. I think the Academy of Sciences
has some of these books. I picked up a few
there a number of years ago—about 20 years.
Lee Hunt was there, and they had a supply of a
bunch of old things over there. I got Physics of
Sound in the Sea and a few things like that over
there. They had a lot of the Division 6 classics
sitting on the shelf, that were essentially free.
I’m not sure whether that’s true today, because
that was some time ago.
MR. VISCO: Ralph, if I can, you refer-
enced, a few months ago, that you had done
some quick turnaround analysis, and I was just
wondering, during the course of your work
during the war, is there some type of a guess-
timate that you can give as to what percentage
of your time was devoted to quick turnaround
type projects, because people needed answers
right away, as opposed to perhaps more pro-
longed study efforts?
DR. BEATTY: Well, certainly it was under
10 percent; maybe even 5 percent. It’s small.
Most of them were longer-term projects.
MR. VISCO: What would you consider to
be the average—
DR. BEATTY: These might be short
projects compared to some today. Because it’s a
wartime period you did things as fast as you
could. So, a couple of months would not be
unusual. Some of those projects, like that Squid
project, that’s two, three, four months just for
data collection and analysis. This other one I
was telling you about was just a one-day
project—that special project for Shockley, one
of the few where I worked directly with him.
I had an interesting social contact with him,
as shown on this second poster board—an
after-dinner picture, labeled ASWORG SCIEN-
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TISTS, with autographs. It was quite an expe-
rience for a young analyst to go out with some
of these older scientists, more established, and
well-known, or to become well-known. Like
Shockley. I didn’t know too much about him,
really. Here’s Bill Shockley on the left beside
Foster Brooks. He’s an OEG old-timer who is
still around—he says he’s got a copy of this
picture on his desk and looks at it. Every year
we invite him to our annual OEG Chinese Din-
ner party and he will call or send a note. That’s
me on Foster’s left. Next is Peter Pearman, who
was on assignment from an OR group in En-
gland, where he had been a prominent member
of the Operational Research Section (ORS) of
Coastal Command. Beside him is Cecil Reyn-
olds, an Army Air Force Colonel who dealt
with various people in our group on ASW mat-
ters. Finally, on his left, is the famous George
Kimball.
MR. VISCO: Where was this dinner?
DR. BEATTY: This was one of the hotels in
downtown Washington. I’ve forgotten exactly
which one. We didn’t do this too often, but I
remember one dinner, in particular, with
Shockley, where I found out about the magician
side of his character. He did all kinds of table
tricks, and tried one on me that led to my claim
to fame—I won a bet from Shockley at dinner.
He had what amounted to a sucker bet that
he tried to pull on me, assuming I’d fall for it. It
involved picking something up leading you to
do something you weren’t supposed to, fol-
lowed by—“Oh, I got ya.” I was suspicious
enough of him to not fall for his trick, so I won
the bet, which was about a dollar, or something
like that. I think I mostly won his respect. I saw
Shockley the magician another time.
He came up to MIT, after the war, to give a
talk on transistors in the physics lecture hall. It
was the first I’d seen him since the war. He was
demonstrating, using magic sleight-of-hand,
the movements of holes and electrons in a semi-
conductor. He had little red and white balls in
his hand that he could make appear and disap-
pear. He was a magician. He was quite an
interesting guy. His history has come out in a
recent book [Crystal Fire]. There’s a lot about
him and his dealings with the Bell Labs group
that invented the transistor and won the Nobel
Prize in 1957. He set up a group on the west
coast to make the transistor into something fan-
cier. He pushed his people so hard that almost
everybody left him. He was a driving force in
starting Silicon Valley, but he made everybody
mad by going into the analysis of race, and a lot
of people hated it. That phase of his life came
much later, however. Anyway, he’s one of our
more famous, infamous people, and I did have
some connections with him, but not a lot. Dur-
ing the war years he traveled a lot. He was over
in England doing work on the Battle of Biscay.
Other senior people also made trips to Lon-
don—I never did get there during the war.
That’s the one assignment I never got, that I
would like to have had. I had practically every
other assignment you could think of, but that
was in the post-war period.
On the poster board, below the Shockley
picture, is an IBM punch card that was put on
there as a little sample of data analysis tools.
The bulk of the data came from ship and air-
craft attacks on submarines. So, IBM cards were
used to analyze all the different attack condi-
tions. The IBM data came from data forms that
were religiously filled out after every attack.
One of the problems was dealing with false
attacks on wakes and bubbles, for example. The
Navy had special boards to analyze each event.
That involved many naval officers who had to
decide how to evaluate each attack—whether it
succeeded, or the extent of submarine damage.
These assessments appeared to be pretty
reliable, but they involved special work and
intelligence data. There were all kinds of statis-
tical data which we were involved with—mak-
ing the forms, and then analyzing them when
they were sent in. Some of the work was done
initially out in the field with squadrons, and
ships. Eventually, the data all flowed back to
Washington for final analysis and dissemina-
tion in statistical reports—a monthly tabulation
of all the ASW activity and merchant vessel
losses. The British also put out similar reports,
covering their forces and areas of responsi-
bility.
Part of the problem of putting these reports
together to indicate what was happening in-
volved statistical analysis most familiar to
actuaries. We had many insurance company
people in ASWORG to complement the other
scientists that included physicists, mathemati-
cians, chemists, metallurgists, and biologists.
There were quite a few actuaries who had ex-
perience in handling this kind of “rough data”
where they used IBM cards. Others got in-
volved with the cards by helping with setting
up the codes to use on the cards. Another per-
son that can tell you a lot about that is Joe
Neuendorffer. Joe preceded me [he was num-
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ber 13 to join]. He’s still around. In fact he’s just
one mile down the road.
He’s very close. His physical condition
makes it a little hard to get around, but he
hasn’t given up his bridge. Betty says they play
bridge a lot. They took good care of me when I
first came to Washington by inviting me for
dinner at their house. They were one of the first
ones to move into Park Fairfax, which was a
new community near here. Other analysts, par-
ticularly some of the insurance people were
there; Alan Hauter, for example, lived over
there. He’s up in Boston now; he’s one I think
you could probably get some dope from about
the old days. Another actuary came to the OEG
Chinese dinner here a couple of years ago. We
hadn’t seen John Boermeester for many years. I
didn’t know him too well. He was one of the
actuaries that worked with the IBM cards doing
statistical analysis.
MR. SMYTH: J.M. Boermeester?
DR. BEATTY: Yes. We have his address. I
can get that for you. He made the trip from
down in North Carolina somewhere.
MR. SMYTH: The reports that you gentle-
men completed—were there briefings that you
gave to Navy Department officials at the end of
these studies? Or was it simply a written re-
port? Or did you actually verbally brief officials
within the War Department or the Navy De-
partment?
DR. BEATTY: There wasn’t much in the
way of formal briefings during the war period
that I can remember. From my point of view,
results were communicated mostly through re-
ports and memoranda. I’m sure that there must
have been briefings at the high levels—such as
the Morse-Kimball level. The top strata un-
doubtedly had their meetings with their coun-
terparts, where exchanges and discussions
would take place. The teams that did the study
didn’t go up and give a briefing. I didn’t get
involved in any of that until almost 10 years
later, when I was in the field with the 6th Fleet.
I remember well when Lt. Jeremiah Denton and
I were flown back to Washington to brief 40
admirals about the new “Haystack” concept of
operations we had started together [with the
blessings of Admirals Felt and Brown]. That
was a very special event.
MR. SMYTH: During this early period,
were there uniformed serving naval officers
working with you during these early studies?
Or, was that a rare occurrence as well?
DR. BEATTY: Working closely with offic-
ers was not the usual case. Most of the time the
scientists worked by themselves. However, in
the field (in Fort Lauderdale, for example) I was
working directly with naval officers. In Wash-
ington we were pretty much on our own. You
didn’t see many uniforms in our spaces.
MR. SMYTH: So the reports were the pri-
mary—
DR. BEATTY: The reports were the pri-
mary communications. We had many contacts
with naval officers, but I don’t know much
about high level discussions and meetings. I
would think some kinds of records must exist
about what took place at some of these meet-
ings. [About 1992, Abe Olshen turned over a lot
of historical administrative information to a
historical data group (including Carl Harris) at
an ORSA meeting in San Francisco]. I do re-
member that one of the early reports that I
specifically was responsible for on weapons
analysis was not presented as a briefing by me.
The two diagrams (Squid Pattern and Spi-
ral Search Plan) on the second poster board are
samples of analysis I was doing during the war,
and then after the war when I went back to
MIT.
We moved up to Boston in 1946 to enter the
MIT Physics Department. Although I was do-
ing graduate work in physics, I was also work-
ing almost half-time as a research associate do-
ing OR for OEG. Splitting my time like that
made life difficult, but it was necessary finan-
cially, to make it a little easier to support my
family. Our first child, Barbara, was born at
Mass General in July, 1946.
I had a responsibility to do naval opera-
tions research, initially in Morse’s office, and
then later in the Math Department. [In 1946
Morse was writing the OR Methods book; I
shared an office with Dave Mintzer, who made
significant contributions to Morse’s book—I re-
member particularly the Lanchester equations
calculations]. The leadership of OEG was
turned over to Steinhardt while Morse retained
an oversight role as chairman of a small advi-
sory committee at MIT. Morse got off on other
things, and by ’47, ’48 he was getting involved
with—I forget the actual timing—Brookhaven,
RAND, and WSEG (Weapons System Evalua-
tion Group). In 1947 I shifted offices to the Math
Department where Professor Wadsworth was
the point of contact for my OR work and I had
a safe to handle classified documents. I had to
spend my time going back and forth between
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doing academic studies and doing OR too. In
addition, the summers of ’47 and ’48 were spent
away from MIT doing full-time work for OEG.
One of the OR projects I worked on at MIT
is represented by the Spiral Search Plan dia-
gram shown on the poster board. These were
called “retiring search plans.” I think that was
perhaps Report No. 51, or fifty something—I
forget what it was! [Actually Research Report
51 on Retiring Search plans]. These plans in-
volved multiple ships that arrive late at a da-
tum (point of lost contact). The problem is to
determine what’s the optimal way to search the
expanding area of possible submarine posi-
tions. The search plans have a spiral shape. It
was a rather straightforward type of calcula-
tion. It’s one of the problems treated in search
and screening that—
MR. VISCO: They called it “retiring?”
DR. BEATTY: Retiring. It’s expanded.
You’re allowing for the motion of the subma-
rine moving out from datum to get away from
the ships that are trying to sweep. The expand-
ing search. What starts as a Gaussian distribu-
tion of possible submarine positions becomes a
donut distribution, or torus. The group of ships
is trying to sweep out through this dynamic
distribution of probable submarine positions in
the most effective way. It turned out that each
plan for different numbers of ships—three,
four, five, six—has the ships in a line-abreast
formation. It’s almost self-evident that’s the op-
timal way to search.
That’s the best way to defeat the submarine
that’s trying to evade the line of ships. The
more ships you have in a line, the harder it is
for the sub to evade. Formulas describing this
effect don’t really show up specifically in the
classic search and screening book, or most other
U.S. sources [except for Alan Washburn’s
monograph on Search and Detection, which
treats evasion of a single searcher]. A more
complete treatment covering evasion of multi-
ple ships in a line-abreast formation is given in
a Soviet text. [The Soviets also calculate the
optimal spacing of the ships, taking account of
line penetration attempts when evasion is un-
successful].
MR. SMYTH: Is that right?
DR. BEATTY: Yes, the Soviets do pay at-
tention to submarine evasion. This became
clear to me in 1982–1983 when I read unclassi-
fied books on Soviet naval OR. I was at SAIC at
the time doing an analysis of potential threats
to the Trident (SSBN) submarine. After devel-
oping formulas for line-abreast search I was
surprised to find the same formulas I had de-
rived. In my opinion the Soviets have done a
good job revising and extending the classic U.S.
texts. Their approach is very practical, with
emphasis on simple analytical formulas.
I might add here that a former OEG col-
league, Allan Rehm, became interested in So-
viet OR some time ago, and was co-chair of a
1997 MORS Working Group on OR and Intelli-
gence Analysis. Allan’s interests were broad,
but I don’t think he got into the naval side as
much as I did. There was another division at
SAIC working in this intelligence analysis area.
It was headed by—oh, what’s his name? I re-
member Judy Grange was there. Starts with a
B. He’s famous for knowing all about the
Soviets.
MR. VISCO: Right. I got an invitation to
his retirement party, recently.
DR. BEATTY: Yes. Battilega is the name.
He and Judy worked in the Denver office at SAI
and consulted with our Trident group in
McLean. We went even deeper than they had
into the area of naval OR tactics, particularly
ASW. Our group also included former naval
intelligence officers who knew the people that
became interested in what we had learned
about Soviet mathematical models of naval tac-
tics—such as line-abreast search (“curtain
search” in Soviet terms) and sonobuoy pat-
terns.
We have just jumped ahead in time from
the war years to more recent times that are
summarized on the fourth poster board—
which includes the item Soviet Naval Opera-
tions Research on the list of SAIC Studies. The
connection with intelligence analysis is a recur-
ring theme that started in World War II. I have
already mentioned the Steinhardt analysis of
DF accuracy and the role of intelligence in at-
tack assessment. Our group also worked with
intelligence people during the war on the
acoustic torpedo problem. I didn’t participate
directly in that analysis. That was Joe Neuen-
dorffer, mostly. He was the expert on that, to-
gether with Ed Uehling, who’s passed away
now. He was a physicist from Seattle, Wash-
ington.
I didn’t realize, till later, that Uehling was
moderately famous in the physics community
as a theoretical physicist. I saw his obituary in
Physics Today that praised the Uehling formula.
I hadn’t appreciated all he had done. He was a
quiet unassuming guy. His history is some-
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thing that’s worth looking at, and Joe Neuen-
dorffer would know more about his ASWORG
work. Joe worked closely with him on this tor-
pedo countermeasure problem.
The Germans had come out with acoustic
torpedoes—the T-5—which was a threat to our
ships. The question was what’s our best tactic
for defeating it? How would torpedoes react to
noisemakers towed behind the ship? The anal-
ysis was a laborious process of making a big
plot and a relative plot, where the torpedo was
moved manually in steps along a track in re-
sponse to hydrophone signals from both the
ship and the towed noisemaker. The torpedo
rudder flip-flops back and forth to produce a
course heading for the loudest target.
In some cases the torpedo might miss the
decoy (noise maker) and hit the ship. You had
to analyze how far back should the decoy be to
provide the best protection. That’s the kind of
thing they were doing. But they needed infor-
mation on how the torpedo worked—it’s con-
trol algorithms. Information was obtained by
interviewing submarine POWs that knew
something about these torpedoes. The interro-
gator could ask—“How does this thing work?”
Here’s an example. If you scratch the tor-
pedo on the nose how does the rudder re-
spond? From the outside alone some of these
sailors or officers would know something like
that. There was an exchange back and forth
between our analysts and the interrogators
from the Office of Naval Intelligence, who
learned what technical intelligence was needed.
I don’t know where the prisoners were lo-
cated—I guess they brought some special sub-
marine POWs closer to Washington so they
could get access to them more quickly.
We were very much involved in that inter-
play of the intelligence. That’s something that
you probably don’t see too often. Some of that
might be in the OEG history book. I wasn’t
directly involved in that aspect of the torpedo
problem, but I was aware of the analysis ap-
proach and knew about the tests of these noise-
makers down in Fort Lauderdale. As we pro-
ceed other examples of intelligence analysis
will be brought up.
MR. VISCO: When you went back up to
MIT for both graduate studies and work of an
OR type nature in the Math Department.
DR. BEATTY: I worked half-time as a re-
search associate, at first with Morse in the Phys-
ics Dept., and later administratively under the
Math Department, where Professor Wadsworth
was the contact point.
Wadsworth didn’t know much about what
I was doing, but he would come down toWash-
ington to attend meetings from time to time.
During this period OEG had a strong leader in
Jay Steinhardt.
MR. VISCO: When did Jay take over?
DR. BEATTY: At the end of the war when
Morse left for MIT. That was late ’45, or per-
haps early ’46 Steinhardt was Director from
that turnover until—
MR. VISCO: He stayed a long time.
DR. BEATTY: Yes. He was there through
’62. He was finally pushed out by people want-
ing to take over with a new approach and new
leaders they wanted to put in charge. During
that entire period I had a lot of contact with Jay.
Before I get back to that post-war period I
should finish up with some more of the World
War II activities.
One of the more important things I got
involved with was the work with Steinhardt on
the ASW aircraft gambit tactics. There’s some
discussion of that in the OEG history book,
although it’s not quite accurate.
This task arose in ’43 when Steinhardt was
assigned to the 4th Fleet in the South Atlantic,
where he was involved with the design of bar-
rier plans to intercept German ships that were
going back and forth from their home bases to
the Indian Ocean. Aircraft were used to not
only intercept supply ships but also to search
for submarines that were operating in the area.
Jay asked for my help in designing gambit
plans to catch submarines. The scenario in-
volved loss of contact on a surfaced submarine
that dives when the aircraft approaches the
contact. The problem was what to do next to
regain contact. One of the techniques was to
pretend that you’d gone away. Just don’t keep
flying around where you where—leave the area
and give the submarine time to come up and
look around then surface when it thinks it’s
safe. Then you pounce in on it, and hopefully
catch it before it can dive again. That’s the
“gambit” concept. The same problem had come
up in other operational areas and a variety of
tactics had been tried.
The analysis I made was not a long, com-
plicated study. It was a short, simple analysis.
The OEG history account makes no mention of
my role, and gives the impression the tactics
were based on an extensive war game of the
problem. I don’t remember we did it that way;
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it was rather a straightforward analysis of time
factors using a square sweep about the lost
contact datum. The size of the square depended
on howmuch time was available on station and
the estimated time for the submarine to decide
to surface.
There was some educated guessing in-
volved, but the plans I prepared with Jay were
tried out. They apparently had some success. I
don’t remember seeing the full details of what
took place, but Jay and Jack Lathrop were given
credit for having caught several submarines
down there. [see p. 39, OEG history] I won’t
question it. All I can say is, if they did, I was
partly involved in designing the plans that
were used. [My records list Beatty, Steinhardt
as authors of ASWORG RR-1, “Tactics for Re-
newal of Submarine Contacts by Aircraft,” 13
May 43]. I wouldn’t swear how events really
took place, but there appears to have been some
kind of success—at least it’s a story that got told
and repeated enough, so people tend to believe
it. Anyway, the fact that I was the initial de-
signer of the plans has been forgotten some-
how.
MR. SMYTH: Not any more.
DR. BEATTY: The OEG historian’s account
may have been influenced by Steinhardt’s field
letters, or other sources I haven’t seen. I don’t
know how the record got distorted. I do know
that Jay had a way of dominating things. When
you worked for him he would tend to dominate
what came out of it. But I was used to that. I
was one of the people that got along with him.
I got to know Jay during the war, when we had
our first training session up in Boston at the
radar school—in fact everybody went through
this training. It was like a CIC school. It was
radar school. You had to know something
about radar. So, we’d go up there for—I don’t
know—it wasn’t a week—perhaps three or four
days. You were briefed on the radars, and saw
them first hand. The radars were on the roof of
the building on the waterfront. I remember it
was cold up on that roof, but it was an exciting
first experience with radar. You could look out
over the Boston Harbor and see everything.
I went up to Boston in the group with
George Kimball, Bernie Koopman (I think),
Steinhardt, and several others. I was one of the
junior guys. I was in that group and got a
chance to know Steinhardt, and Kimball, in
particular. We’d go out to dinner, then come
back to the hotel for discussions. I remember
George—you wouldn’t believe what he was
doing for fun in the hotel room while the rest
were talking. He’d been briefed on radar and
the so-called “telegraph” equation, which is
about how the microwaves travel. There’s
George, deriving the telegraph equation and
working it all out. [Laughter.]
MR. VISCO: For recreation, right?
DR. BEATTY: For recreation. Yes. He re-
ally knew his math and physics—he was fa-
mous as a quantum chemist too. He wrote one
of the textbooks on quantum chemistry. I
worked fairly closely with him on several
projects and had a lot of respect for him. He
was a very quiet man. I still remember having
breakfast downstairs at this hotel in Boston
with George sitting across from me, not talking
much, although you know he’s thinking most
of the time. [Laughter.]
Another chance to meet people socially oc-
curred later when I was stationed in Boston on
a team and would come down to Washington
for short meetings. Some times we would stay
overnight at the Hay-Adams, where there was
a special ASWORG suite that was used mostly
by Morse, Kimball, and Shockley. It was an-
other way you had contact. You had to meet
them because there was a big suite with con-
nected rooms. You might also see them for
breakfast, or go out to dinner, occasionally. You
had some chances for contact, although these
men were often off to London and various
places. They traveled a lot.
When I first came to Washington I was
staying in a little place up in Northwest, right
off Georgia Avenue, in the Petworth area with
another OEG guy. The two of us had lived with
a family there that was very kind to us. I re-
member, they even took me out to my first
Washington Redskins game during the war—at
Griffith Stadium. My roommate was Jack (John)
Little. He died just recently. Jack’s big project
was making the only ASWORG movie. The
movie, or animation, was about the complex air
patrols flown around a convoy or a ship forma-
tion for protection against submarine attacks. It
demonstrated the optimal pattern to fly a cir-
cuit about a moving formation.
When I came back from Boston in the sum-
mer of ’43 Jack and I moved to another place
out Wisconsin Avenue in the area of Tenley-
town: In fact that’s where I met Doris. She was
working in Washington and staying with her
aunt and uncle on Warren St., near Nebraska
Ave. Jack Little and I were rooming there to the
end of ’43; in ’44 Jack was away for a long time
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on a field assignment to the CSF (Caribbean Sea
Frontier). In late ’44 I went on the field assign-
ment to Ft. Lauderdale, but returned briefly in
February ’45 to marry Doris and take her back
with me to Florida. I guess I’ve covered almost
everything about World War II but—
MR. VISCO: But by this time, where are
we in terms of the calendar?
DR. BEATTY:Well, I was jumping back to
’43 there. And then ’44. There were a lot of
things going on from the last half of ’43 through
most of ’44—various projects—it’s hard for me
to remember them all. I remember doing anal-
yses of screens for task forces, and I have a list
of most of the memoranda and reports covering
not only the war years but later time periods as
well. I’ve got a pretty long list of documents I
don’t have it at hand at the moment, but I’ve
got it here somewhere and could show you one
of the longest lists of publications of anybody in
our organization. That’s just an indication of
some of the other projects I might mention.
For example, I remember an analysis of
some Italian charts. We got some data from an
Italian ASW attack chart—their fire control sys-
tem. From this limited information I was sup-
posed to analyze how it really worked. That
was a short, several day study. I didn’t know
Italian, but was able to figure out how it
worked. The analysis was an eight page report
[ASWORG RR-31, Evaluation of Italian Naval
Anti-Submarine Attack Charts, 25 March ’44].
I also did another quick analysis of a mod-
ification of the fire-control for shooting Hedge-
hog projectiles. This ahead-thrown attack sys-
tem fires an elliptical pattern of charges ahead
of the ship to sink rapidly and hit the subma-
rine target. Time-to-fire is gotten from a range
recorder, which presents target traces on a
sheet of moving paper. The slope of the range
marks on the recorder can be measured using a
clear, lined overlay to match the traces. The
pivot point of the overlay is set using a little
cam, or ruled plate, on the recorder frame that
can be adjusted for submarine depth, speed,
and Hedgehog characteristics. The Navy
wanted a quick upgrade to the old cams and
came to us for help. I made the calculations for
ruling a new set of cam plates that must have
been stamped out somewhere, and presumably
issued to many ships. You would think these
calculations would have been done in-house,
but we could do it much faster than that system
could. In a few days we had an answer.
There were other short tasks we undertook
to come up with new tactics. [See, for example:
ASWORG RR-53, Derivation of Firing Time for
Two-Ship Attack on Deep Submarine, (Beatty),
25 May ’44].
DR. BEATTY: John Coyle is still around
somewhere, although he’s hard to locate. I
haven’t seen him lately and I haven’t tried to
reach him since our last OEG get-together . . .
[Both of us attended the Navy OR meeting in
’97 in Quantico—at Bruce Power’s invitation].
MR. VISCO: Yes. He hasn’t been to any of
the dinners?
DR. BEATTY: He hasn’t been, recently.
He’s got an island up off Maine and spends a
lot of time up there, I think. He has a house
over in the District. I think if you’d call his
house you might find someone who can at least
tell you where he is—if he’s out of town, for
example.
MR. VISCO: Okay. Let’s focus on about 10
minutes, wind up here—
DR. BEATTY: Yes; let’s see. I was talking
about World War II—mostly Atlantic ASW in
’43 and ’44 I was in Ft. Lauderdale in ’45 when
the war with Germany ended and interest
shifted to the war in the Pacific. The develop-
ment unit I was attached to was tasked with
evaluation of sonar countermeasures against
Japanese attacks on our submarines. We were
studying the effects of countermeasure devices
that are ejected when under attack—small cyl-
inders with sonar transducers or bubble gener-
ators to jam or confuse ship sonars. Some of the
loudest noisemakers generate sound mechani-
cally. Other devices act as repeaters of active
sonar signals. Usually, a large number of dif-
ferent types of countermeasures are launched
together to make it difficult to be seen under-
water. We were making tests at sea trying to
simulate some simple Japanese sonar. Most of
the Japanese were using listening systems that
we imitated using a little barge, or platform,
with an over-the-side hydrophone dipped in
the water. There was a lot of dead time waiting
for the submarine to come by. I remember
catching sharks and fish while waiting for
something to happen.
We also had some ASW ships go in to see
the effects of all these jammers and decoys.
These tactics are still important today for that
matter. It was quite obvious that numbers were
important and time was a factor, since the ef-
fects don’t last forever—the submarine would
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come out of the region of disturbance, and
might be picked up again.
MR. SMYTH: What was your base of op-
eration? Were you in Hawaii or—
DR. BEATTY:Oh, on this? That was at Fort
Lauderdale. That was part of the surface anti-
submarine development detachment. They also
had the air detachment at Fort Lauderdale’s
airfield. That’s where the famous five airplanes
disappeared.
MR. VISCO: Right. The TBMs.
DR. BEATTY: I mentioned earlier that
some OEG old-timers were at that air station:
James Dobbie and Martin Klein were there. I
know Martin is alive [saw him on TV recently],
but I’m not sure what Jim Dobbie’s condition is
today. I haven’t heard of him passing away, but
I think he may have been ill and possibly not an
interview candidate. The last I heard he was in
New England, and I suspect that someone up
there, like Dave Boodman, might know about
Dobbie. It’s worth a try because he’s one of our
more famous OEG members. His work was
quite outstanding—particularly his analysis of
multiple target surveillance which was pub-
lished in the early ORSA journals.
The Soviets really picked that up. They
liked it enough to include it in their own trea-
tise on search theory. They rewrote it with
some simplifications and modifications, but I
got the impression they think Dobbie is great.
MR. VISCO: Koopman published the clas-
sic U.S. book on Search Theory.
DR. BEATTY: Yes; right. But Dobbie’s con-
tribution was substantial. We haven’t heard
from him in a long time. I hope he’s still okay.
He should be interviewed before it’s too late.
Getting back to this current interview, after
the war I went back up to MIT and worked on
retiring search plans and surface ASW attack
systems, while doing graduate work in physics.
Doing both at the same time was difficult. Be-
sides, during the summers, I was back full time
doing ASW work. By this time the Fort Lauder-
dale detachment had moved down to Key
West. It still had the same name, but it was a
new group located again at an old Coast Guard
headquarters—on the end of the pier. The fa-
cilities are still there today, and I think there is
some Coast Guard activity there. On a recent
visit to Key West I saw patrol boats, including
hydrofoil boats, tied up there.
In the post-war period both the air and the
surface development units were down there.
After two short assignments in ’47 and ’49 I
returned for a full year in ’51 when I relieved
Joe Neuendorffer and was, in turn, relieved by
Fred Berghoefer. Both should be on your inter-
view list. I think Joe Engel was also down there.
No. It was Howard Kreiner. We overlapped.
Howard was assigned to the air unit.
Before these Key West assignments I got
involved in the ahead-thrown weapon contro-
versy: Weapon A vs. Weapon B. These were
both long range (about 1,000 yds) rockets with
high rates of fire (5 sec. interval for the larger A,
1 sec for the smaller B). Late ’46 to early ’47 I
wrote two memos comparing these alternatives
[“Comments on Weapon A and the Problem of
Attacking High Speed Submarines,” 19 Dec ’46;
Comments on Weapon A and B,” 21 Feb ’47].
During the summer of ’47 N. Shear and I par-
ticipated in Attack-Teacher tests in Key West to
collect attack error data. We prepared a joint
memo [“Probability Calculations Surface Craft
A/S Attack Weapons Against Type 21 Subma-
rine—Preliminary Results Based on Attack
Teacher Tests,” 25 Aug ’47]. I continued to
work on this problem at MIT and in Washing-
ton during the summer of ’48, resulting in a
large report: OEG Report 57 [“Evaluation of
Anti-Submarine Weapons for Use by Surface
Craft,” 28 July ’48]. I consider this report to be
one of my most significant pieces of work.
MR. SMYTH: Was that 57 or sixty—
DR. BEATTY: 57. I know both Steinhardt
and Irwin Baumgarten (later OEG Director)
thought very highly of this work. It should be
unclassified. I’ve never gotten a copy, but I
think it’s unclassified by now. They should
send me a copy of it. I’d like to see it again. It’s
an analysis of all the component errors, and it
makes comparisons that influenced the weapon
Alpha versus Bravo evaluation.
BuOrd was, of course, very involved in this
weapon selection problem. My analysis tended
to favor Weapon Alpha, partly because it had
an influence fuse that gave a large damage area
per shot—it’s a lot like this Squid pattern
shown here—but, with the advantage of much
longer range. Part of the influence of my anal-
ysis was the fact it used more realistic sonar
location errors than those used by the BuOrd
analysts. I don’t know where they got their
data, but it wasn’t very good. In their analysis,
the location component was a relatively small
part of the total error—and not too important. It
turned out, however, from tests we made in
Key West, that the location error was not nearly
as accurate as they thought. When you got ac-
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tual data from sea trials the location was poor,
particularly with scanning sonar rather than
searchlight sonar. Also, you didn’t have depth
determination on any of those sonars. You had
to let the rocket fly and sink through the water
as fast as possible. Although these rockets went
down pretty quick, deep, fast targets could still
be a significant problem.
My analysis, Report 57, became fairly influ-
ential and the Navy made the decision to go
with Weapon Alpha. They built it, put it on a
ship, and sent it down to Key West for tests. If
I can remember correctly, it was on my first one
year tour to Key West after I got my PhD in ’50
that the Weapon Alpha rocket firing tests were
conducted.
In fact, one of the ship’s officers was a
friend of mine, Commander Wallace, who I had
met on the SurASDevDet staff on an earlier Key
West tour. I visited him in Boston when his ship
was being fitted out with the new weapon.
As I said earlier, that MIT period had been
cut by several summers of assignments to Key
West and Washington, doing strictly OR anal-
ysis for about three months. That cuts a big
chunk out of what you’re trying to do up at
MIT. The last year at MIT was the exception
when my research associate assignment was
purely academic.
[Second part of interview]
DR. BEATTY: The open source discussion
was a short digression to recent times. Other-
wise, the interview covered events up through
most of the post-war period when I was at MIT.
I touched on parts of the post-MIT period that
started in late 1950.
So probably, now, we ought to get into the
’50s and ’60s, and—
MR. VISCO: Yes. Just to make the point,
we ended that first session at the 1947–48 pe-
riod. So do you want to move on from there,
then? Or does it repeat?
DR. BEATTY: No; it ended about there. As
I said, while I was a graduate student at MIT I
was working half-time as a research associate
doing operations research. This meant I was
slowed down trying to get my degree. Shifting
gears between OR work and academic studies
was really quite difficult. In addition, three
summer periods were spent away from Cam-
bridge on OR assignments. As I remember, the
summer of ’47 was a full time assignment in
Key West at the Surface Antisubmarine Devel-
opment Detachment.
The summer of ’48 was spent full time in
Washington, working at the Pentagon. I don’t
remember that period well enough to tell you
what was going on. It probably involved ship
ASW weapons. In the summer of ’49 I was back
in Key West working on the same kind of
projects.
When I returned to MIT in the fall of ’49 I
quit my old half-time research associateship in
order to concentrate full time on finishing my
doctoral work. I was assigned to the acoustics
laboratory to work on acoustics problems
closely related to the subject of my PhD thesis.
My thesis advisor was Phil Morse, who, as I
had mentioned earlier, had started the acous-
tics lab during the war. I worked some with
Dick Bolt, a senior member of the lab I had met
during the war, but mostly I worked for Leo
Beranek who had come from Harvard to be a
professor in acoustics at MIT. As a matter of
fact, I can show you an old MIT report where I
am listed officially in the acoustics laboratory,
working for Bolt and Beranek on things like
transmission of sound through walls. My thesis
on transmission of sound through double walls
was completed at the end of ’50.
I like to compare the listing—Beatty, Bolt
and Beranek—with the more famous—Bolt,
Beranek, Newman—(well known today as
BBN). As a matter of fact, I gave serious con-
sideration to joining up with them after getting
my PhD, but the fact that I had already invested
a lot of my career in operations research led me
in that direction. I was comfortable with OR
and knew I could go back to work for OEG at
probably a better salary than I could make
starting in a new field. Today I’m not sure.
Maybe if I had gone with BBN I might have
been a millionaire by now—or long ago! But I
opted not to do that.
But anyway, I don’t really regret it. Going
back into operations research was really the
thing to do. It meant opportunities to travel a
lot. I got into many things in the coming de-
cades that I hope we could cover. I probably
will touch only lightly on the decades after the
’50s and focus mostly on the 50’s period.
I guess I should phase in here talking about
what happened when I left MIT. I went back to
Key West for a full year assignment starting at
the end of ’50.
I was involved in things like a sea trial
comparison of scanning sonar versus search-
light sonar. That may have been a little earlier.
I think we were also doing tests on the later
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version of Squid, which was called Limbo. This
was an ahead-thrown weapon with a much
longer range, comparable to the U.S. weapon
Alpha and Bravo projects that I had worked on,
which came to fruition with the weapon Alpha
being put on a destroyer and being sent to Key
West. As noted in my earlier interview, I ob-
served the testing of the weapon Alpha rocket
that goes out about 1,000 yards. So it’s fairly
spectacular to watch. It was a while before they
got it under control.
Weapon Alpha had a short lifetime. It was
overtaken by the longer range weapon, Asroc,
which could shoot out to about 10,000 yards,
instead of only 1,000 yards. The Asroc payload
was an acoustic torpedo with a range of about
1,000 yards, so that target coverage was a circle
with a correspondingly large radius. Thus, the
fire control problemwas greatly simplified, and
the problems I had concentrated on for shorter-
range weapons were no longer considered sig-
nificant.
Even though weapon Alpha doesn’t exist
anymore, and no one thinks much about it, I
note that most Russian ships have something
on them which has some similarities to weapon
Alpha. These ahead thrown weapons shoot a
pattern of rockets from 1,000 to 2,000 yards and
thus provide a “last ditch” defense system to
attack submarines. If something would happen
to counter the long range attack systems they
would have an alternative defense. I suspect
that one of these days there might be a come-
back for some of these direct attack weapons
that don’t depend on torpedoes!
MR. VISCO: Yes. These were rocket-
launched depth charges?
DR. BEATTY: These were rocket-launched
depth charges. They could be fused either mag-
netically or acoustically. Or, you could set them
to go off at a certain depth, which means, in
that case, you have to worry about knowing the
depth of the target. Today, our sonar is not too
good at doing that, particularly at longer range!
The depth problem is not a worry when the
torpedo can search in depth.
After about a year down in Key West I
moved back to Washington where I was as-
signed to the Pentagon as head of the antisub-
marine warfare team. I was also assigned as a
Scientific Analyst to an OpNav ASW office
(OP312), where I worked for CDR George Bull-
ard on a War-At-Sea study.
MR. SMYTH: Now when you say you
were assigned to the Pentagon, it was in fact the
Department of the Navy, though?
DR. BEATTY: Oh, this is still the Navy. It
was OEG. It was still under MIT; that was true
until the break in 1962. Let’s see. Where was I?
MR. VISCO: Were you physically in the
Pentagon?
DR. BEATTY: That’s where our offices
were. It was some time in the late ’50s that they
started to make some shifts to Rosslyn. We
finally moved out of the Pentagon in the early
’60s. We were in the Pentagon for a long period
(over 15 years).
I was there until the summer of ’53, when I
had an assignment in Japan. This was Jay Stein-
hardt’s doing—he wanted me to be out there,
partly because he had started a special project
that required someone to coordinate operations
in the field with Washington agencies. The
project involved collection of intelligence data
from operational flights, very similar to what
are known as Ferret operations. This involved
airplanes that flew along the coast to collect
electronics intelligence—particularly along the
coast of China.
I got involved in working with the ECM
personnel whose main job was ELINT collec-
tion. We were using the word “fusion” for what
we were doing back then. This was also a pe-
riod when there was interest in our ability to
conduct strategic strikes from the sea.
There was quite an interest in the ability of
the Navy to attack with a nuclear bomb. At that
time the primary attack weapons were propel-
ler-driven ADs. The AD was slow (subsonic),
but it had long range and could go low. Getting
under the radar coverage was a big advantage.
I remember getting very much involved in
all that. During that period we worked part
time in a cave on the base at Yokosuka, which
was an interesting secure place. I also flew
down to the Philippines (Sangley Point), where
I was scheduled to fly on one of the ECM
flights. But when I got there a message had
come from Washington that said, in effect: “Dr.
Beatty is not allowed to go on that flight. His
clearances are too sensitive to allow him on that
flight.”
I did get to fly in one of the same planes,
but it was just on a test mission, where we
calibrated the equipment by flying over the
island of Corregidor many times, on different
headings. I had real good views of Corregidor.
The ECM plane was a somewhat unusual type
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of turbo-prop, with something like a RAM jet—
not a RAM jet—but a jet-assisted pod that
could make the plane go very fast. The desig-
nation was P4M.
As noted earlier, this project was some-
thing that Steinhardt had gotten involved in,
and was very interested in. Since I had the
clearances, he wanted me to be out there to
follow up, monitor, and run this project.
MR. SMYTH: Could you add a little bit
more detailed information? You say you were
out there, but who were the other members of
the team and where were you located within
the Navy organization in Yokosuka?
DR. BEATTY: In Yokosuka, I was the OEG
Rep assigned to the Staff, Commander, Naval
Forces, Far East. That meant I had my own little
office there. There had been an office there for a
number of years, particularly during the Ko-
rean War. Initially, I shared the office with Sid
Shear, who preceded me as the OEG Rep. The
Korean War was just ending up, and the very
first things I got involved in were, acting as a
liaison with the OEG people that were actually
stationed at sea with the 7th Fleet and the car-
riers. There were several fleets out there.
That included the 3rd and 5th Fleets, and a
number of carrier divisions. It was a pretty
active period. I got involved with making ar-
rangements for some of our Reps to make vis-
its. One of the places where a lot of this got
done was the Officer’s Club in Yokosuka,
where the staffs would come in to relax and
have informal meetings. A lot of business got
done that way.
I got to know a couple of the admirals very
well—some that Steinhardt had also gotten to
know. When Steinhardt came out to visit he
rode a carrier all the way out to Yokosuka from
Hawaii, I believe. That was quite a long trip for
the director to be out there, riding on this car-
rier. It was with Captain Griffin, who would
soon become an Admiral.
Jay was just along for this ride, getting
familiar with carrier life at sea. But that’s the
way you make good friends with people in the
Navy. Get to know them while living with
them, and putting up with each other.
Griffin got to be someone who Jay knew
very well, and, as a result, I got to know him
pretty well too. He later became a senior officer
with a carrier division and other positions lead-
ing to OP03 in the Pentagon, where we got
involved in doing some special studies for
him—some top secret studies of carrier opera-
tions in a strategic role in the Pacific. How
many carriers you should have in groups; how
well could they make strikes; and how safe
were they? We got into things like how well
could they be tracked by DF, by the Chinese
land-based DF systems.
To give you further flavor of being on that
staff, another officer I met there was Admiral
Felt. He had a carrier division and knew a
number of senior OEG people pretty well. He
was one of the senior naval officers who really
read the OEG reports and wanted to know
what was in them, and appreciated them.
One day he came in, and just appeared at
my office door in Yokosuka. It was a narrow
office with a real nice big leather chair. I don’t
know where that chair came from, whether it
came from the Japanese or not—I’d love to
know. But it was a very big leather chair that
the Admiral settled in and asked for a quick
summary of what new reports are available,
and so on. Meanwhile, the people who had
ushered him in the building, his escorts, and so
on, were just going wild.
The people in the building were expecting
him to see our Admiral up on the second deck,
and Admiral Felt was lost in the building.
[Laughter.] He wasn’t delayed terribly long,
but it was just enough to shake everybody up.
They finally located him in my office and
quickly took him back up to meet the admiral.
That was just an interesting little event, of my
first meeting with him. It was significant be-
cause he played a big role in what happened
when I went to the 6th Fleet in ’56. That was
two or three years later, when he had become
the commander of the 6th Fleet, and I was the
OEG rep assigned to him. But that’s jumping
ahead a little bit.
But covering our relationships there at
COMNAVFE, I was a civilian on the staff, but
was treated like an officer on the staff. I at-
tended all the regular meetings, much of which
was really boring. It wasn’t something that I
had a great need to know about. But in order to
not miss significant things, you had to put
yourself in where you were participating in the
full staff discussions of every problem they got.
A lot of it might be considered OR today
because people are more interested in all kinds
of management issues. While some of that was
not of great of interest to me, my time in Japan
was very interesting. Steinhardt made several
visits while I was there, including a visit when
I was the OEG Rep on the 7th Fleet. He liked
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Japan. So I had to entertain him when he came
to Japan, taking him sight-seeing, and so forth.
He fully enjoyed it and was interested in pho-
tography, as I was too. I got a fair number of
pictures that we took together.
MR. VISCO: How long was a normal tour.
DR. BEATTY: Normally, that was about a
year and a half, but my assignment actually
went from ’53 to ’55, including the time at 7th
Fleet. My tour was unusual, because I was ac-
companied by my family for most of the period.
When I first went out, I was by myself. When
Steinhardt visited in December ’53, he decided
that I needed to be out there longer, and my
family ought to go too.
At first, there was some resistance to doing
that. As I said earlier, my wife was one of the
few, initially, during the war, to be out on a
field assignment with me. But that was quite
different. This was the post-war period, when it
was not a policy to have the wives on OEG
overseas field assignments. Part of it had to do
with where would you stay and could they get
housing.
But he had seemed to have discovered that
it would be possible to get housing on the base,
and it was on those grounds that he got my
wife all set up to go out there. She went out on
MSTS, and joined me right after Christmas, in
January. I’d gotten a Japanese house off the
base by that time, out in Kamakura, near the
big Buddha. That was interesting, to have my
children along to experience living in Japan.
My oldest child, Barbara, was born in ’46, so
she was old enough to go to school by train and
bus to the base in Yokosuka.
As it turned out, however, we really
couldn’t live on the base. That turned out to be
all wrong, when my family arrived. After get-
ting over the initial problems of setting up to
live off base, we adjusted well and ended up
preferring to live in Kamakura. It was better,
even though the traveling took more time. I
loved traveling around Japan. There were
many opportunities to get to Tokyo, where we
had meetings—official and unofficial—with
members of other Operations Research groups
living in Japan.
There was a bar in Tokyo that I think the
ORO people must have discovered first, but
everybody else tended to visit there when they
were in Japan. I got to know some of the Air
Force people pretty well, including Bob John-
son, one of the senior people working with the
Air Force. I got to know him quite well, but I
lost touch with him some time ago. I’m trying
to think of some others whose names I’m not
sure about. I remember meeting Darwin Stol-
zenbach, who had a beautiful house in Tokyo.
MR. VISCO: ORO.
DR. BEATTY: Yes, with ORO. There were
enough others to hold joint OR sessions, where
we met on a monthly basis, rotating between
the groups. These included dinners or lunches,
where the host would be a senior person from
that base, like the Admiral or General. These
meetings were a good opportunity to exchange
information.
We didn’t really work that closely, that of-
ten, but there were opportunities, such as war
games, for example, to get together on a work-
ing level. Some of that was kind of fun. We’d go
up to Tokyo and participate with all the OR
people being involved, and getting to know
each other. I participated in at least one of those
games. I also was the host whenever they had
the meeting down at Yokosuka. I remember
one of the meetings up in Tokyo where the host
was the now famous black Air Force general—
what’s his name?
MR. SMYTH: Davis.
DR. BEATTY: Davis. Benjamin Davis. I got
to know him. I had met him on one of my trips
out there. Even though I was in Japan, I made a
couple of trips back to the States, partly for
consulting with personnel there, and reporting
on all our projects. When I went back on one of
those trips I was flying VIP class with the gen-
eral, and we were both making a stopover in
Hawaii. I was going through, and he was stop-
ping over in Hawaii for a number of days. After
we were scheduled to take off again, that
evening, I was surprised when he showed up
on the plane. He was so upset with his treat-
ment in Hawaii. He said he wasn’t going to stay
there, that this was impossible. So he was suf-
fering that kind of difficulty back in those days.
He flew back to Japan on the same plane with
me, and I met him again later when he attended
one of our MORS-like dinners, where he was
the host.
There was a fair amount of contact out
there. A lot of it was almost unofficial, only
partially official, sometimes joint work. We got
to know quite a few people that way.
MR. SMYTH: If I could just clarify. You
went over to Japan in mid ’53?
DR. BEATTY: Mid ’53.
MR. SMYTH: And you returned when?
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DR. BEATTY: I returned in ’55, after a tour
at 7th Fleet. I’m trying to remember exactly
when I shifted—some time in ’54, I think—to
the 7th Fleet assignment. That meant that my
family was left back in Japan while I was off on
the flagship. Normally the ship visited many
interesting places, so you’re away from base for
long periods.
I joined 7th Fleet about the fall of ’54—
maybe it was early ’55. I’m not quite sure, but it
was just before the offshore island crisis with
China. I know that we were scheduled to make
a stop in Taiwan at the naval base (Keelung)
near Taipei. That was during the period when
there was a lot of excitement about the Que-
moy-Matsu war with China. As a matter of fact,
things got so tense that our visit to Hong Kong
and Singapore was canceled. We were stuck in
that area for a long time.
To provide better communications we had
shifted from the cruiser to a command ship. We
acted as the communications center for the Tai-
wan Defense Command, and assisted in setting
up a shore-based command in downtown Tai-
pei. We made a lot of trips back and forth from
Keelung to Taipei.
That was a period when I got to visit some
Taiwanese radar sites. One was on the north tip
of Taiwan. A short helo flight along the coast
took us to this radar site, where we observed,
on radar, Chinese planes as they took off from
airfields in China. It was fascinating to watch
the big CIC (Combat Information Center) board
plots of all these Chinese airplanes, all written
with Chinese symbols.
We also made a trip down to Kaoshiung on
the southern part of the island, where we vis-
ited the Taiwan Navy base and Officers Club. A
brief stop was also made at a little offshore
island (Pescadores) between Taiwan and the
mainland, where there’s another radar site. We
went ashore in small boats to the beach for
picnic and beer, followed by an official visit to
the Command Center.
While these activities were interesting,
there was a real concern with the possibility of
a war starting, and what might happen. Admi-
ral Pride had taken over as commander of the
7th Fleet. I was working with his staff, trying to
be helpful in solving the Admiral’s problems.
There was great interest in the junk problem—
whether there might be an invasion using large
fleets of junks, and how to handle this threat.
The fact is people were worrying about this
problem even when I was up in Japan. One of
my predecessors there had gotten involved
deeply in this to the extent of getting hold of a
bunch of junks in order to make tests. It was
like an OpTevFor (Operational T&E Force) as-
signment for this person—Henry Rugo—who
we haven’t heard from for a long time.
He had been working out of our base in
Japan when Sid Shear was there. Sid and I had
overlapped a little, while he got very interested
in the problems of mine clearance and tests of
mine-hunting sonar. Joe Engel, who followed
me to the 7th Fleet, also got interested in the
mine hunting problem, particularly the prob-
lems of false targets, clustering effects, and so
on
I don’t know when it got started but—
MR. VISCO: The routing sheets?
DR. BEATTY: The OEG routing sheets.
When CNA opened its museum for the 50 year
Anniversary in 1992 some of these historic rout-
ing sheets were displayed, showing the names
of all these famous people like Jay Steinhardt,
Joe Engel, and others. Since everybody went by
initials, everyone knew a person’s initials. The
key thing was the extent to which people really
used this to communicate—something like e-
mail.
It’s like a slow version of e-mail, but there
were a lot of comments squeezed on these
sheets, depending on the topic. Of course, ev-
eryone was always waiting to see what Jay was
going to say, because he was the director at this
point. He not only “ate those up,” he also “spit
them out.” Wrote some real biting comments;
he could shoot something down real fast with a
pertinent comment.
I think I have in my possession a copy of
one of the old reports, with a tattered sheet on
the front, with some interesting names on it.
I’ve got it around here somewhere. But I don’t
know how many are actually left. There are
probably not too many extant, you know. But
they’re interesting from a historical—memora-
bilia point of view.
MR. VISCO: Let me add a comment on
that. At ORO, we had a routing sheet that went
on reports. It had blocks where you filled in the
names of the people.
DR. BEATTY: Right. The order, how it was
going and—
MR. VISCO: Right. And it also had a date
when they received it, when they let it go. Well,
I have a lot of those reports in my personal files.
A couple of years ago I lent one of these reports
to somebody in the Pentagon—somebody in
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the Army—to look at it. After I retired, it finally
came back to the office, and the secretary sent it
to me. It had the date that the report was signed
out to me. And of course it had never been
signed back in again, which she pointed out.
The library would be after me because I had
this report for about 30 years. [Laughter.] You
know, it’s fun to go back and look at some of
those old sheets. They get tattered and torn—
but that was the way the library used to send
stuff out.
DR. BEATTY: Better jump on to the 7th
Fleet here. I haven’t gotten to the 6th Fleet yet,
so better finish off the end of the 7th Fleet tour.
It was a key period with all those tensions with
China, and worrying about the threats of the
junks. I remember, even after many years, that
the Navy made many tests of junk vulnerability
to various weapons. They tried all kinds of
things.
They were hard to sink. Napalm was one of
the more effective things to use. At least it
would wipe out everybody on board. They
tried all kinds of weapons. It was like a field
operational test and evaluation, but with real-
istic targets—the junks acquired from the Chi-
nese.
Not only were they tough targets, there
were a whole lot of them. It was an OR type of
problem. How do you handle this? This was
one of the things we were trying to analyze. But
what kind of floored me was the attitude to-
wards that of the 7th Fleet Commander, Admi-
ral Pride, who had made it quite clear that if
there was to be an invasion like that, the most
effective weapon was the atomic weapon.
I don’t know whether he had approval for
taking such drastic action, but I think he might
have requested permission to knock them out
with atomic weapons. That was to me a little
scary, and it dampened research on solving the
problem by more conventional techniques. I
wasn’t in that assignment all that long, but I do
remember worrying about the possible Chinese
invasion of Taiwan and how to counter it.
I was still involved, to some extent, in fol-
lowing the operations of our Navy flights doing
intelligence collection. I was one of only a few
people in the organization who had the clear-
ance to be involved in that.
Finishing up that assignment, I was re-
lieved by Joe Engel, and came back to Wash-
ington in ’55. [I might inject here, that getting
back on MSTS required messages to Washing-
ton to approve my travel; my family was no
problem, but I was only accepted because I had
a Dr. title that was stretched to mean medical
Dr.] When we came back, we moved to the
Falls Church area rather than Fairlington,
where we had lived before going to Japan. We
were there less than a year before moving to
France for an assignment to the 6th Fleet.
I had a tour in the Pentagon where I was a
scientific analyst to the nuclear warfare desk.
One of the main projects that I remember there
was the Navy’s attempt to develop a nuclear-
powered seaplane. This was something they
were serious about. This was the big P—Martin
flying boat—big enough to actually carry a nu-
clear propulsion system. It was a very ad-
vanced system that was technologically too
ambitious for its time. The other project I re-
member was development of umpire rules for
war games. I may have mentioned this earlier,
but it relates to the work at 6th Fleet.
When I got to 6th Fleet, the summer of ’56,
there was Admiral Felt. He was just ending his
tour there. We had a couple of port visits to-
gether.
Home port was in Villefranche, a really
wonderful place on the bay close to Nice. We
had a villa that looked out on the bay toward
Cap Ferrat. I relieved Joe Engel at 6th Fleet and
moved in to the same villa that he had rented.
That was another connection with Joe, who had
relived me at 7th Fleet.
There is a picture on the third poster board
showing the USS Salem in the bay of Ville-
franche. Somewhere in this picture is the villa
where the Engels and the Beattys lived. As a
matter of fact I showed that to Joe’s wife one
time, when she came to the annual OEG Chi-
nese dinner party where I had this poster on
display. She was really excited to see her villa
there, even though it’s hard to see.
MR. SMYTH: You’ve had, obviously, in
the first half of the 1950’s, a number of overseas
assignments. Were these pretty much at your
request, or how many people comprised OEG
at this point, and why was it that you were
continually heading overseas?
DR. BEATTY: Well, I liked to travel; I was
available; and, partly, Steinhardt sent me
places.
MR. SMYTH: There was mutual agree-
ment.
DR. BEATTY: Oh, yes, yes. You’ve seen
both Joe and I were in the field a lot in that
period. In my case, part of it had to do with my
having the clearances, and that Steinhardt
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wanted me to be out where I could use them. I
don’t remember, exactly, what all was involved
in my going to the 6th Fleet, but I was very
fortunate to have gone at that time. I considered
it the best assignment I ever had. Everything
was ideal in terms of all the relationships, and
the acceptance of new ideas.
Excuse me. (pointing to poster.) Here is the
picture showing me in my office in Japan, in
Yokosuka, where Admiral Felt came in and was
lost by his escorts. Here I am at my desk in my
regular chair. Beside this, was a much bigger
leather chair where visitors, like Admiral Felt,
could sit.
But this is mostly about the 6th Fleet. I
should note here that I’m now pointing to one
of these poster boards with 6th Fleet pictures.
Otherwise, it’s difficult when you’re trying to
figure out later what’s going on here.
As I mentioned before, Admiral Felt was
there for only a short time. We were just getting
involved in starting up new concepts. Preced-
ing me was a lieutenant on the staff—Lt. Den-
ton. You’ve probably all heard me mention
Denton’s name very much—Jeremiah Den-
ton—just a lieutenant at the time. He and I got
involved in working closely together.
Denton was a flier. He had been involved
in evaluating airborne electronic warfare sys-
tems, such as the APS 20 radar. He even flew
blimps to evaluate the radars on the blimps. He
had gotten to know a number of senior people
through that evaluation period. In particular,
he got to know Admiral Felt very well. Admiral
Felt had great respect for Denton and believed
everything he said. Denton had a long experi-
ence of looking at radar scopes and was full of
this idea of making it more complicated for
people to look at the fleet with their radars.
There’s a big debate about who invented
this concept of dispersal of the fleet in order to
make it hard to find the carriers. Even within
OEG there’s debate. Some of my own people
give more credit to Denton than they do to me,
even though I was involved in developing this
concept even before I got to the 6th Fleet. I
might add that it was John Coyle who first got
me thinking about this concept.
John Coyle had been involved in a strategic
war game where the concept of many radar
targets was introduced to confuse the Strategic
Command bomber people. This led to the need
for umpire rules to cover such situations in war
games at the Naval War College. I noted only
briefly before that I worked on this problem
before going to the 6th Fleet. While John Coyle
was a big pusher of this concept of lots of radar
targets, he tended to stress putting radar reflec-
tors on smaller ships to make them look bigger.
There were a lot of people, though, who
thought carriers were too big; they would stand
out in comparison to the smaller destroyers.
They thought you couldn’t solve this problem
too well. Denton’s experience with the APS 20
radar, which is a very powerful radar, indicated
otherwise. Many ships gave relatively good sig-
nals. Variations with target aspect injected an
element of variability.
If the ships were all lined up parallel to the
coast you could then make a comparison and
probably pick out which one is bigger than the
others. But as soon as you start pulling them
apart and changing their direction, then it gets
much harder to pick out which one is the big-
gest. Classification by radar becomes even
more difficult when you are faced by large
numbers of ship targets, such as the merchant
ships in the Mediterranean. They aren’t as big
as carriers, but they are pretty decent radar
targets, and there are a lot of them—over 1,000
merchant ships there. Of course, an essential
part of the idea was to get the fleet dispersed in
the background of merchant shipping. Denton
and I went to work developing, implementing,
and testing this concept.
Prior to the 6th Fleet project we had worked
on techniques for calculating how a fleet of
aircraft could locate a target in a background of
similar targets. It was like hunting for scud
missiles. You’d have to go down and get close
enough to identify each target.
I was already making some of the very first
simple models of investigation theory to deter-
mine how quickly you could find the carrier
targets. With enough planes in a wave you
should be able to find the target fairly quickly,
particularly if you’re not worrying about being
shot down. As soon as you put in the threat of
being shot down, then it gets a bit trickier.
The whole business of making various
kinds of attacks and investigations is almost
like sweeping minefields. It’s a similar prob-
lem. I got very interested in the mathematics of
that and made a very simple model that could
be used for war gaming.
Thus, it wasn’t as though we hadn’t
thought about this problem. We were pushing
the same ideas. Denton was very strong at it,
and he was really good at writing papers, like
white papers, that an admiral can appreciate.
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Hit all the issues real well, explain why we
need to do this, and so on.
Despite our different approaches, we col-
laborated well. We were a team; we worked
together. While he was convincing the admiral
and developing tactics, I was also involved in
tactical planning for conducting exercises and
data collection. One of the aspects I addressed
was the ASW implications. When you disperse
widely, you don’t have your ASW screen any-
more. Now you’re vulnerable to submarines. Is
that going to be much of a problem?
In those days, we were only thinking about
survival for four hours—long enough to launch
all our nuclear strike aircraft. That was the goal.
Of course we wanted to survive a lot longer
than that. Some people, such as the ASW offi-
cer, weren’t too happy with the conclusion that
you can actually do pretty well at sweeping
along without a close screen of escorts, because
the submarines are going to have a hard time
getting to the carrier that quickly. I always was
the one that followed up with the ASW analysis
to support the basic concept.
MR. SMYTH: You got to 6th Fleet in ’56?
DR. BEATTY: Yes, ’56.
MR. SMYTH: If memory serves, that was
on or about the time of the Suez crisis.
DR. BEATTY: It was.
MR. SMYTH: Yes. Any involvement?
DR. BEATTY:We were right in the middle
of it. Matter of fact, that was one of the things
that sold the Haystack concept to the new ad-
miral, who was Admiral Brown, who relieved
Felt.
Felt was only there for a short time while
we got started, but I still remember his depart-
ing speech. He gathers all the commanding of-
ficers to give a big presentation to everybody—
all his admirals, captains, commanders, and
many others as well.
And what does he do? Right in the middle
of this, he has Jerry and me stand up and be
recognized, and he thanks us. “I want you guys
to listen to these two. They’ve got something
important to say. Pay attention.”
That was the kind of a guy he was. He was
really sold that we knew what we were talking
about. Before answering the question about the
Suez crisis involvement, let me describe the
early stages of Haystack development.
After some initial planning we began to
make some initial tests of simple versions of
Haystack. First, I should explain that the word
Haystack came from Denton—as in find the
needle in the haystack. That’s one reason Den-
ton is given credit for inventing the Haystack
concept. Despite that we remain good friends: I
don’t take it away from him, but I still feel
somewhat unfairly treated in the matter of rec-
ognition.
As I said above, we collaborated closely.
We were called “the gold dust twins,” because
we went everywhere together, giving briefings,
and working with other staffs on tactical plans.
We got involved in test planning. I got involved
particularly in the data collection and analysis.
My job was to determine how well the attack-
ing planes had done in finding the carriers. The
opposition came from bases primarily in Italy.
Carrier task forces, including logistic forces,
were dispersed widely in various areas of the
Mediterranean.
In general, the concept worked rather well.
The search and attack planes didn’t do very
well at finding us. It took them a long time to
find us, even in our initial dispersed forma-
tions, while we were still in the learning phase.
We had run through all the details of con-
ducting dispersed operations. How do you
handle your communications when widely sep-
arated? How do you manage your planes that
are trying to land while you’re operating with
hardly any radio transmissions. How do you
avoid giving away your location while maneu-
vering dispersed units?
There are many of details that I still can’t go
into, but this poster presents some information
from a news article. This came from the Wash-
ington—was this the Post? Yes. No. Where is it?
Anyway, the title is—“Cat Brown’s Kittens
Have Claws.” [Laughter.]
DR. BEATTY: Like we’re the kittens and
I’ve got claws. It’s a long article—I think a
“Saturday Evening Post” article. In fact it is the
“Saturday Evening Post.” There’s a little ex-
cerpt here.
This reporter was on board watching what
was going on. He writes it up in a way that
provides a summary of the concept.
He says—“Traveling with the fleet, evalu-
ating its operations, with the unbiased eye of a
layman, is a thoughtful young MIT scientist, a
PhD whose job it is to determine, by cold math-
ematics, the effectiveness of defense and attack
procedures.” I won’t try to give you all the
other details. He goes on to explain how this
new era has arrived. The fleets go out and you
don’t see any ships out there. It’s a little scary.
A lot of people were not sure about it.
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The ASW officer was scared. He thought
this was a stupid idea—ASW-wise. We had
opposition. As a matter of fact we had a visit
around this time by Edward Teller. Professor
Teller arrived, in company with Admiral Hey-
ward. He’s the Admiral Heyward that just
passed away.
He had a couple of Nobel Prize winners
with him. They came out to visit the fleet, in
particular, Admiral Brown on his 6th Fleet flag-
ship. We went over and met them on the car-
rier, flew back with them and had dinner with
them. Then we gave them a briefing on the
Haystack concept.
I don’t know whether you got that one
[poster board] before, or if you took the picture.
MR. VISCO: Yes, I did. I didn’t get it
printed yet.
DR. BEATTY: [discussing first two poster
boards] Here was the real early one. You’ve
covered that. And here was the one during
World War II showing Shockley and Kimball.
What I’m looking for is not on this one, but
another set of charts which has a picture of
Teller and the staff, when we were greeting
him. I’d like you to get that picture, because it
would add to the Haystack story. Can you stop
for just a second, while I see if I can put my
hands on that chart?
MR. VISCO: Where were we?
DR. BEATTY: We were at the 6th Fleet.
MR. SMYTH: I think we were with Dr.
Teller and the 6th Fleet.
DR. BEATTY: Yes. I was explaining this
picture of the development of the Haystack
tactics. [The Teller picture shows him kneeling
before Admiral Brown, who is “Knighting”
Professor Teller with his sword while members
of the staff and the Teller Panel look on. More
on this later.]
We traveled all over the place making these
Haystack tests. For example, I flew in with
Denton to Naples to collect the data forms from
the aggressor pilots in Naples, who had been
out there to attack us during one of these exer-
cises. They told us what they thought hap-
pened, and turned over the data forms I had
prepared for them, along with their track
charts, narratives, and radar photography. We
flew back to the ship where I could start to
analyze what they really had done when they
said they had attacked certain targets.
That analysis was not easy. It was pretty
hard to resolve a large amount of conflicting,
and frequently inaccurate, data, such as track
charts and radar photos of often poor quality. It
was hard work correlating data from both the
offensive and defensive forces. Many attacks
were on questionable targets. For example, at
least one attack was probably a cruise ship off
the coast of Corsica. I was doing most of this
reconstruction in my stateroom, where I had a
desk, file cabinets, and a safe. Often, I was
working late at night with pictures and data all
over the place. It was a slow difficult task to
pull that all together.
When the Suez crisis developed we were
out there in the middle of it. We went into one
of our Haystack formations while the French
and the British carrier forces were so close that
the admirals were sending messages back and
forth about interfering with each other. They
didn’t like what we were doing, and we didn’t
like what they were doing.
Meanwhile, we were watching everything
they were doing with airborne early warning
radar. This was one of the things that Denton
had stressed—getting our ships to appreciate
the value of looking at radar pictures from
AEW aircraft.
They had the consoles on the ship—our
cruiser had them. You could downlink the
video picture to the ship to see what that plane
was seeing. That was called Bellhop. The reli-
ability had been so poor that hardly anyone
wanted to bother with it. It wasn’t something
they were trained to look at very much, and
they didn’t fully understand the potential ben-
efits. It was a real struggle to get operators
trained to use Bellhop.
Denton was pushing it, and I was also
spending a lot of time in CIC observing and
encouraging Bellhop use, particularly when we
got some direct land-based AEW coverage
from the Willy Victors, the WV-1. That’s the big
Constellation plane with a big APS 20 radar.
Those are very powerful AEW planes that can
see ships at long ranges. We could get a link
with them quite frequently. When they came
out we could not only have a good picture we
could also be talking to them.
In fact there were times during the Suez
crisis I got more deeply involved than I wanted.
Normally only officers would talk on the net to
the people on the WV-1 aircraft. But Denton
was away, and in the crisis I got thrown in.
MR. VISCO: You filled in.
DR. BEATTY: Yes, I was filling in, talking
to the Willy Victor about what they were doing.
No one on the ship knew these people and their
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operations the way Denton and I did. Denton
had close personal contacts and had flown with
some of them. Let me make this point by relat-
ing the Christmas story.
During the Christmas period of ’56 the
Dentons had planned a party at his house for
the crew of one of the WV-1 planes that hap-
pened to be in Nice. But something went wrong
with the Denton’s furnace. They had soot all
over the place.
There was nothing to do but transfer the
whole party to our villa. This meant moving a
lot of these people, who were staying at the
Ruhl hotel over in Nice. I went down there with
my blue-and-white Chevy that was like a con-
vertible with not much passenger space. But
you could put people on the front and the back.
[Laughter.] I must have had a dozen of these
people, that I picked up at the Ruhl and drove
through the streets up to our villa in Ville-
franche, where we had quite a party.
Also at the party was “Doc” Abbott, who
was the operations officer on the carrier divi-
sion we had worked closely with on Haystack
operations. He was another close friend of Jerry
Denton. The two ended up having races with
these little cars that you can control [laughing].
They were both quite talented and competitive.
Every time I have gotten into a little athletic
competition with Denton, I have regretted it.
He makes fun of me. [Laughter.]
My golf shots can be erratic at times, which
seems to amuse him. I admit, I’m not much of
an athlete, but I enjoy playing golf for the plea-
sure of being outdoors. But Denton likes to
excel in all kinds of sports.
We had quite an interesting time that
Christmas. Getting to know people, like George
Washington, who ended up in charge of all the
Willy Victor planes, was mostly through Den-
ton’s knowing these people. Being a friend of
Denton helped a lot.
Another interesting event I mentioned ear-
lier was the Teller visit. One of the reasons for
the visit was that Teller had just submitted an
article about why the Navy needs to put its fleet
under the water. In other words, he was rec-
ommending nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
that can submerge. He considered ships so vul-
nerable that you could only save them by put-
ting them below the surface.
He was writing a big article on this that was
going to appear in various places. He was do-
ing this for the Air Force. It was a real blast at
the Navy about this problem of ship vulnera-
bility. So, it was important to feed him this new
concept.
MR. VISCO: Do you remember the date of
that visit that’s in the photograph?
DR. BEATTY: I can’t quite place it. It’ll take
me a little while to spot it. I’m trying to remem-
ber whether it was before or after we made our
big trip to Washington, where we briefed a
large gathering of admirals on the Haystack
concept. I think this was in ’57. Probably in the
spring of ’57; something like that. I can eventu-
ally put it together but I’m not quite sure now.
It’s in that time period, but I don’t think we had
everything in order to put before him. It had to
come after we had collected our latest set of
radar data of all the Mediterranean. What you
see here is only a partial picture of what we had
shown.
We had a montage of radar pictures we’d
collected. I had collected all this radar scope
photography, that included high altitude pic-
tures, but some ship data gotten when we had
radar ducting, and could see ships well beyond
the radar horizon. The radar was painting ships
at ranges over 100 miles—that was on one of
our sweeps over to the Straits of Gibraltar,
where the ship traffic is quite dense.
It’s not everyone at the same time, but at
different times. It gives you the sense where the
merchant ships are, showing where the traffic
streams are. At the same time you can see areas
where the distribution is more diffuse. Down
along the coast and streaming into Straits of
Gibraltar it gets crowded. The picture we
showed to Teller was bigger and more com-
plete than what you see on this poster. This is
just a sample reconstructed from memory, il-
lustrating the idea of what we did.
On the left is the Bull’s-eye formation with
the carrier at the center of a circular screen of
escorts. On the right is a dispersed formation
hidden in a background of merchant ships. The
Bull’s-eye stands out very clearly, while you
have to remove the merchant ships to see the
dispersed ships in the Haystack formation. We
did this using a clear overlay that we pulled off
to reveal the Navy ships. Even then, the carrier
positions were not immediately obvious. When
the overlay was put back on the naval ships
appeared to vanish. With the Bull’s-eye you
could still see it clearly when the merchant
shipping was added.
This was a very simple-minded demonstra-
tion. But, it obviously made a big impression on
Teller.
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MR. VISCO: Yes. I’ll bet.
DR. BEATTY: It really did. In fact, he said
he’s going back and rewrite his whole speech.
His whole paper. He canceled it and revised it.
The Air Force got back to him some months
later to convince him to rethink his position,
and get him back on their side. [Laughter.]
To me it was very significant and very in-
teresting. Participation in that was one of the
most interesting things, I think, I’ve ever done.
Returning again to the Suez crisis in late
’56, I remember watching the French and Brit-
ish carriers up near Cyprus. We could see them
clearly on our radar scopes; they were in Bull’s-
eye-like formations. There were also amphibi-
ous ship groups that were easy to spot. Those
were very important for the big invasion down
to Egypt. I could see them on Bellhop. I was
making crude tracks while trying to get some-
one excited about looking at this interesting
data. Elsewhere on the ship people were study-
ing more conventional intelligence trying to fig-
ure out what was going on. What’s going on?
Where are these ships? What are they doing?
“Look—those must be those amphibious
ships that you’re worrying about. They’re over
there. Get someone working on this.” Well, no-
body’s trained to do this. You need to be able to
take this picture from Bellhop (it’s on a regular
PPI scope), get someone to make a copy on a
clear overlay, and make target tracks. It gets
real tricky when you’re trying to track some-
thing complex like that, but significant groups
would stand out. You should be able to track
them easily if you do it right. It’s something
Navy personnel weren’t trained to do—surface
tracking using AEW radar pictures. It was so
frustrating trying to push this. Denton was
away for part of that period and I was on my
own trying to handle it.
Besides, we were right in the middle of
important air activity, with bombers flying
from Cyprus, right over us. In fact I would go
down to CIC and watch to see what they are
seeing on their radar scopes. What’s their pic-
ture look like down there? Kind of confusing. . .
Then I go up on deck and I look up—there
are trails showing clearly that they’re in a line-
abreast sweep, coming directly overhead. You
could count them easily—something like 20, 30
bombers in several waves. Attacking this prob-
lem optically, you get a really good picture of
what was happening.
That’s another defect, that they couldn’t
absorb that data. I’m sure lookouts on deck
were looking up and observing the trails, but
the information was not getting down to the
CIC in a useful way. Even with radar, they
weren’t tracking all those bombers very well.
A different kind of excitement during the
Suez crisis occurred one night when we were
tasked to enter Alexandria on a rescue mission.
We were making a dash there, while making
plans to take a large number of refugees on
board the flagship. At the last minute another
ship was assigned to take over the rescue mis-
sion. I didn’t get to Africa until many months
later on a peaceful visit to Tripoli in Libya. I did
get to see a number of other interesting ports on
that tour, including Istanbul and several Greek
ports.
Rhodes, in particular, was also exciting, in a
different way. That’s where Jerry Denton and I
were ashore together, riding bicycles together.
[Laughter.]
He was ahead of me, going down the street.
I was right behind him. I hadn’t ridden a bicy-
cle for a long time. My bike had these hand-
brakes which I wasn’t familiar with. I pulled
the handbrakes suddenly, they jammed, and I
went flying through the air on to the street.
Jerry looked back and sees me lying on the
street and comes back and rescues me. [Laugh-
ter.]
You know, he made some fun of that story.
About Ralph Beatty ending up on the street.
There are other fascinating stories that people
love to construct that I will leave to some other
interview in the distant future.
MR. VISCO: Do you want to finish off that
anecdote about your Rhodes adventure?
DR. BEATTY: Yes. I should say I was not
seriously injured. It was something that I suf-
fered from for a while. I wasn’t sure whether I
might have broken some bones or something. I
never did get patched up but I felt of sore for
some time. I should have gone to the doctor
and gone into sick bay, and probably would
have recovered faster. I think I may have
cracked a rib or something.
MR. VISCO: Oh, my.
DR. BEATTY: It was something I didn’t do
too often. I haven’t ridden a bicycle much since
then.
I remember other memorable visits during
that tour to the 6th Fleet. Naples was a port we
visited frequently. That was one place the
wives could get to more easily than others.
Majorca was another nice place to visit. I
never did get to Spain proper, though I did get
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to Lisbon. Jerry and I were together in Lisbon,
and we were also together in Majorca. Our
wives joined us there.
Another time we were on Capri with the
Dentons, and took the trip up to the highest
point on the island. We rode an outdoor cable
up to the top where the view was spectacular.
We got some good pictures of the two couples.
You can see that my wife got along real
well with Jane, and Jerry and I got along well
also.
MR. VISCO: Yes. Those relationships were
extremely important, not only socially but also
professionally.
DR. BEATTY: After leaving the 6th Fleet
we continued our close contact—through the
Vietnam War period when Jerry was a POW,
through his time as a Senator from Alabama, to
his retirement in Mobile. We still remain in
close contact with Jerry and Jane and their chil-
dren on a continuing basis today.
MR. SMYTH:When did you get back from
6th Fleet?
DR. BEATTY: We got back in the fall of
’57—in October when Sputnik went up. We
were making our return from Nice, driving up
through France into the mountains, where you
felt like you’re isolated from civilization.
Then there was this thing about Sputnik in
the newspaper. You know, what’s going on?
I remember that’s when we were making
our return trip. I also remember Jay Steinhardt
had held me over there as long as he could, to
try to finish up a report on Haystack. It was an
embarrassment to not have a smooth final re-
port. This was tough stuff. No one truly appre-
ciates the analysis that’s required for this revo-
lutionary type of project.
I was doing this single-handedly, putting
all this material together. He held me over a
couple of extra days to make sure I had at least
something partial—representing our contribu-
tion to this effort, plus getting a commitment to
continue to work on this, and complete a final
report, when I got back to Washington.
I finished the Haystack report in ’58, I
think. It was an unusual report issued jointly by
OEG and the 6th Fleet. The report was based on
the data obtained from Haystack exercises Al-
pha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta. I gave a briefing
on that over at CNA, a number of years ago, to
get them thinking about the early beginnings of
information warfare.
I don’t think the Navy has fully wakened
up to the significance of the initial Haystack
concept, now over 40 years old. I suspect the
Navy may have overreacted by relying so
strongly on information warfare, as though it is
some new discovery.
Looking at the history of Haystack-like
concepts, it seems as though it goes through
cycles of about five years, when a new group
comes out with a new version of it, where they
give a new name to it. They won’t buy the old
one. It’s got to be something new. That’s prob-
ably why the Haystack name doesn’t get used
much. But it was the initial version—that’s over
40 years old. [Laughter.]
DR. BEATTY: There were many other peo-
ple that got involved in similar ideas. The
Pacific Fleet came up with what they called
random-metric distributions—or something
like that. It was not quite the same thing as
Haystack.
We have debates about it now, but it’s gone
on over the years, where different admirals will
come along with different carrier groups and
develop similar concepts, rediscover some of
the old ideas, but push different aspects of it.
There’s a long history of these develop-
ments. It goes up and down, through phases
and people, where they’re trying to do various
version of the concept. Now they want to use
islands or exploit inlets on the shoreline. Some
of this is a distortion of the original concept of
being able to do this far from shore. I get very
frustrated when I see what they’re doing or not
doing.
At the same time, I’m also intrigued with
the extent to which many groups are really
pushing the whole idea of information warfare,
which is really what this is about the Haystack
concept was the first development of informa-
tion warfare. It needs to be brought to the at-
tention of those people who are selling it now.
You’ve got to think about this aspect of it. It’s
not just cyber war. That’s part of it; you know.
In fact you should worry more in this tech-
nological age about the extent to which all these
things work and don’t work. I tried to address
some of these issues when I worked on Hay-
stack reports during the period, between the
6th Fleet assignment and my tour in Hawaii
from ’60 to ’62 at the ASW Forces Pacific Com-
mand and CincPacFleet.
One was OEG Report 77. I mentioned ear-
lier this was an unusual report. It presents both
an analysis and a description of the Haystack
concept. It also includes the detailed 6th Fleet
instructions on the operations.
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Then there was a technical analysis of the
first dispersed formations, faced by waves of
attacking planes. That was OEG Report 81. It
was an air defense analysis with some similar-
ities to a typical APL defense analysis. It differs
by including the concept that the attackers
don’t know where all the targets are. The air-
craft are not coming in with all the streams
headed for a small region of capital ships. We
had disagreements with APL over this different
approach. How do you do air defense and in-
clude effects of target location uncertainties?
One of the things I got involved in during
this period was a test led by the WSEG (Weap-
ons Systems Evaluation Group) in about 1959
of electronic warfare.
I was very much involved in those tests as
a planner. I’m trying to think what I was doing
at that time. I have to compose my thoughts a
little bit more.
MR. VISCO: You were thinking of the
WSEG tests in ’59?
DR. BEATTY: Yes, the WSEG tests. I was
trying to put it in relation to some of the other
things I was doing too. I was the OEG rep to the
Planning Committee and I remember meeting
with the Navy admiral who was in charge,
trying to decide what didn’t we like about these
plans, and what do we think needs to be
changed. We were saying we have to make sure
this is not a set-up, where they can come in and
cream the Navy with attacks focused on known
target positions. We feared we we’re going to
look bad if we’re not able to exploit one of our
main capabilities of deception to complicate the
targeting problem. That would be left out of
these tests.
So we kept trying to put those ideas into
the test design, while trying to do all the other
conventional ECM tests at the same time—
checking out your Aegis type systems and all
your other missile radars and electronic sys-
tems. There were a lot of people and forces
involved in this evaluation. We never did get it
quite the way we wanted, but we did influence
the selection of the kind of threat aircraft, and
some of their tactics coming in, so it wouldn’t
always be a set-up.
It’s hard to remember all the issues that
came up, but we had some basic arguments
with APL about the philosophy of doing air
defense—whether it’s active, or passive. In
OEG, we were using the term total air defense
to mean the combination of active and passive
defense.
I probably should have used the words
information warfare, so that we could lay claim
to that. But that’s what we were doing. [Laugh-
ter.]
As noted earlier, OEG Report 81 was my
analysis of total air defense, similar to the Hay-
stack concept. It was an analytical model of air
defense, where you’re doing offense and de-
fense at the same time. Instead of converging
on a small area, the attacking aircraft are com-
ing in streams, or channels, and don’t know
where the principal targets are located.
The attackers have a choice of picking tar-
gets at random for standoff missile attacks, or
approaching each target to close range to at-
tempt identification. Meanwhile, they’re being
shot at and lost. When the counter-targeting
and active defenses are both working effec-
tively the offensive forces suffer high attrition
rates. This type of model was later extended
[Atlantis III in ’74] to include submarine attacks
and space surveillance.
MR. VISCO: Would you care to give any
advice, or suggestions for the younger analysts
coming along, or even some of the senior ana-
lysts that are still around?
DR. BEATTY: One of the things I would
stress is looking to the past and not forgetting
the past. Pay attention to what’s happened be-
fore. There might be some useful ideas there.
Also, pay attention to the impact of tech-
nology on what you’re doing. Make sure you
master the tools for making good models. It’s
not necessarily the latest artificial intelligence
program, but maybe it’s a combination of some
simpler things.
But I’m afraid that we’re somehow not
training people properly in some of the more
historic ways of looking at things, stressing the
significance of applying simple analytical mod-
els based on operational data before construct-
ing complex computer models.
You know, I started out with very simple
investigation models before I went to the 6th
Fleet. These were pretty straightforward geo-
metric models, looking for the optimal path
width. A field of random targets was divided
into channels. How much do searchers deviate
to see everything? How wide do you make the
channels? Make it too wide and you’re going to
go back and forth without advancing very fast.
Make it too narrow and you don’t cover much
of a channel. There’s an optimum there that can
be approximated relatively simply.
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This whole concept can be extended to
mine sweeping. In fact there are some models
that are very similar to what I was doing in ’56.
My simplification of Fahs’s CNA model in ’79
was presented at MORS around ’92 or ’93, or
so. It was about the time I went out to
Monterey, I think.
It was an analysis showing how you could
model the investigation process. Coming after
Desert Storm, I applied it to the case of hunting
for Scud missiles in a field of random targets.
There’s a simple mathematical formula for it. If
you’re in a channel and advance from one tar-
get to the next one on your track, you can
derive a fairly complicated integral that can be
calculated on a computer.
Jim Fahs did that at CNA, and got a pretty
neat model. As a CNA reviewer of Fahs’s pa-
per, I derived a simpler version of it, which
matched his almost perfectly.
It turns out that Robert Arnold of OEG, I
think, had done the same calculation in 1956. [I
only learned about Arnold’s paper recently.]
After the MORS meeting in Monterey, I learned
that two Englishmen solved the same problem
in April 1979.
When I gave my paper in Monterey, Alan
Washburn, who’s one of the more talented the-
orists in search and investigation theory at the
PG School, said he didn’t quite understand
what I was doing. I guess I didn’t present it as
well as I might have. It was just a bunch of
slides. I think he had gotten it but wasn’t quite
sure where I was going with it. More impor-
tantly, he gave me a reference to something he
had seen, that was very similar, by some guys
in England [M.R. Bathe and P.J. Haysman,
Royal Military College of Science, Operational
Research Branch, Shrivenham, September
1979.]. Done almost the same thing as a matter
of fact.
Bathe and Haysman had carried out a de-
tailed calculation arriving at a closed analytical
solution in the form of an Airy integral. Pretty
fancy. [Laughter.]
When I got back home, I looked at it and
discovered that my simplification turned out to
be the first order approximation to his Airy
integral. In other words, if you take this Airy
integral and expand it first order you get what
amounts to my simple formula—which is like
taking a Pythagorean type approach to it. The
best distance here is the hypotenuse, where the
sides are the average along-path and cross-path
errors. Combining those mean-square errors in
that simple way gives an answer pretty close to
the optimal answer.
That was something I did at CNA while
reviewing Fahs’s paper.
MR. VISCO: So sometimes simpler is good
enough.
DR. BEATTY: Yes. It’s simpler, but some-
times it takes a little longer to do. That’s been
my problem. I get on a problem and I think I’ve
got to simplify it I sometimes take more time
than I should, just to make sure I get a simple
version. But there are times when you can ap-
ply that simple approach to get a quick answer.
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